In a message dated 5/27/04 11:14:24 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Just got this from the listserv, and thought you'd want to know that's where it went. :-)
My apologies. I have no idea how I hit "reply" and sent a message to this list!
Art Spitzer
___
In a message dated 5/27/04 5:51:25 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Have you picked a date? Did I miss something? Thanks
Monday July 12, lunchtime. SORRY I forgot to convey that! Are you still available?
Art
___
To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTE
On Thursday, May 27, 2004, at 10:49 AM, Rick Duncan wrote:
I think the point is that from an economic
perspective, there is little or no difference between
a targeted $1,000 tax and a targeted exclusion from a
generally available $1,000 benefit.
One difference in practice would be that all the ta
Art,
Have you picked a date? Did I miss something? Thanks
--
Tony Mauro
Supreme Court Correspondent
Legal Times/ American Lawyer Media
1730 M St., Suite 802,
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-828-0327
Fax: 202-457-0718
___
To post, send message to [EMA
I guess there is a difference between the questions whether
a state may target religion by imposing a tax on it and whether a state
may avoid taxing others to pay for religion.
Louise Weinberg
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
At 09:49 AM 5/27/04, Rick wrote:
If it is pure rational basis, I
guess the legitimate
I was going to respond to Doug along these lines - but Marty beat me to it
and wrote a lot better post than I would have.
Alan Brownstein
UC Davis
At 03:13 PM 5/27/2004 -0400, you wrote:
I agree with Doug that, as a practical matter, the denial of the
scholarship operated as a penalty on Davey'
I agree with Doug that, as a practical
matter, the denial of the scholarship operated as a penalty on Davey's choice of
majoring in theology -- what we would ordinarily think of as an unconstitutional
condition: Davey's religious choice realistically prevented him from using
the $$ even to
Alan Brownstein wrote:
> For the same reason in Locke, if the student majors in theology at a
college he pays for with his own funds, he can not be denied > a
scholarship for his other studies.
Well, actually, he could be and he was. If he declared a major in
Theology, he lost the scho
1) It seems to me that even if the prohibition evenhandedly
applies to political and religious activities -- not at all clear given
some of the other statements that seem to be more focused on religious
activities, or even religious activities except a few favored ones -- it
would still be
I don't read the manager as saying that "most public religious
activities" are prohibited "in the park." As I read him, he's saying
that such activities are allowed, but only in the shelters (as is true,
as I read it, of political rallies and events by private companies
[which I suppose might
I definitely take the view that religious speech and expressive
conduct may not be treated more favorably than political speech and
expressive conduct.
Eugene
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Marty Lederman
> Sent:
I don't know that I can explain or rationalize constitutional doctrine
relating to taxes and subsidies, but the distinction between taxes and
subsidies, burdens and benefits, takings and givings is fairly pervasive in
constitutional law -- so much so that it is hardly surprising when the
Court
Eugene: Putting aside (if you can) the question whether it is permissible
for the park to confine "political activities" to "a reserved shelter or
room so they do not interfere with other park patrons," do you agree that
religious activities should not -- must not? -- be treated more favorably
tha
It looks like there is a policy of prohibiting most public
religious activities in the park. Wouldn't that be unconstitutional in
a traditional public forum (which the park, though not the river, likely
is), even if there is no discrimination? But it would also be some
evidence that there
Obviously it's a framing bias, right? The two policies are equivalent in
economic terms: The person who studies theology is $1000 worse off than
everyone else. Our intuitions might be to treat the policies differently,
but isn't that irrational? It's like opposing the gas station's "credit
c
Rick's discussion touches a point that I find particularly troubling
about the Locke decision. Rick is correct that Joshua Davey could have
kept the scholarship if he had double enrolled at two colleges and used
the scholarship to pay for tuition at the college where he had not
declared a theology
Doug and Marty's intuitions are mine as well. I am
just trying to figure out reasoning that decides Locke
one way and the tax case the other.
Another distinction emhasized by Locke and which forms
part of its narrow holding is that in Locke the
student could still keep the scholarship (in theory a
Rick Duncan wrote:
I think the point is that from an economic
perspective, there is little or no difference between
a targeted $1,000 tax and a targeted exclusion from a
generally available $1,000 benefit. The Court has
specifically made this point on many occasions
including, I believe, in Sherber
--- Marty Lederman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What would be the conceivable state interest in
> imposing such a targeted tax? Assuming there is no
> legitimate interest in singling out "theology from a
> devotional perspective," the classification would
> violate the Equal Protection Clause, an
If it is pure rational basis, I guess the legitimate
interest might be in raising revenue. The law is
generally very deferential toward classifications
concerning tax policy, even toward classifications
that appear irrational(just look at the IRC for an
infinity of examples).
I think the point is
What would be the conceivable state interest in
imposing such a targeted tax? Assuming there is no legitimate interest in
singling out "theology from a devotional perspective," the classification
would violate the Equal Protection Clause, and presumably the Free Exercise
Clause as well, per
Suppose a state enacted a $1,000 per year tax on
students majoring in theology from a devotional
perspective. Would this violate Free Ex under Locke?
Would it be unlawful viewpoint discrimination under
the FSC?
Rick
=
Rick Duncan
Welpton Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of La
22 matches
Mail list logo
