As I read this, I found myself wondering what the point is of having
constitutionally protected free exercise if the exercise is only free when the
legislature decides it is. The scenario you describe seems to be one where
the legislature is free to demand or prohibit any conduct they like,
On Mar 13, 2005, at 10:55 AM, Brad Pardee wrote:
...would you say that the Catholic Church is required, by
anti-discrimination laws, to hire women as priests unless the
anti-discrimination law was to specifically exempt the Church?
It seems to me that the Catholic Church in America doesn't hire
The term hire refers to any position in which one is employed,
regardless of how one got there or the motivation for doing so.
There is, of course, an exemption for religious positions in religious
organizations in Title VII and it would be required in any event under
the Free Exercise clause.
I agree that the Free Exercise clause requirea an exemption, regardless of
whether or not Title VII provided for one. However, Marci's position, as I
understood her to explain it, is that there would be no exemption under the
Free Exercise clause for a neutral, generally applicable law unless
Title: Message
In
response to Prof. Newsome's questions below, I would, first, simply repeat that
my original question was whether anacross-the-board exemption from valid,
secular laws given, by either a legislature or the Supreme Court,to
religious persons/groups, and them alone, can be
- Original Message -
From: Paul
Diamond
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2005 8:17 PM
Subject: Good News From Across the Big Pond
If I may be so bold as to give a perspective from the United Kingdom.
The case of SB is extremely poorly argued and
per incuriam
Marci,my comment was responding to Marty's and Tom Berg's earlier post,
about harm to third parties being part of the criteria courts employ in
determing whether an accommodation the legislature has granted should be
struck down on Establishment Clause grounds. Several federal and state
court
