To Gene Summerlin:
"Congress cannot prohibit,
at all, the free exercise of religion"?
Do you really assert the "free exercise of religion" commandment authorizes
anarchy, that the "free exercise of religion" means no exercise or action
in the name of religion can be prohibited?
I cited two
Mr. Garman, You are missing the point made by Gene Summerlin, at least as I understand it. He is not asserting that his extreme reading is any more accurate than yours, just that like yours, it is a possible, but not the only possible, reading.There are many, many cases in which the Court has inde
No, Gene, I don't think the clause means that Congress
cannot prohibit, at all, the free exercise of religion, nor do I think the
clause is violated only when Congress totally prohibits the free exercise of
religion. Both of these extreme positions seem to me to be equally
wrong.
Gene Sum
Gene Summerlin:
The Free Exercise Commandment has a meaning. That meaning is understood best
by its own wording. I believe my understanding and use of those words fit
grammatically and historically. I cited additional sources for understanding
the correct meaning, in the words of Thomas Jeffe
Alan's analysis has to be correct. What is happening in this case is
that the equality principle established in Mergens/Good News Club is starting to
swallow up any reasonable disestablishment principles.
My concern about the case is that there was evidence that the religious
organizati
If "prohibiting" so clearly meant "totally," Gene would not
have to insert "totally" into the sentence everytime he quotes it and tries to
explain it.
Douglas Laycock
University of Texas Law
School
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78705
512-232-1341
(phone)
512-471-6988
(fax)
On Nov 21, 2005, at 11:45 AM, Douglas Laycock wrote: If "prohibiting" so clearly meant "totally," Gene would not have to insert "totally" into the sentence everytime he quotes it and tries to explain it. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 51
Steve,Government can restrict people from putting religion or nonreligion beliefs into action. No discrimination involved. Specific religion and nonreligion actions can be prohibited or abridged by the laws of society. The question is not under what circumstances government can do so. Government c
I think Mr. Garman is trying to assist
those who are having difficulty grasping the concept that government may
abridge, but not prohibit, the exercise of religion.
James Madison and Company did not waste
words.
Larry Darby
-Original Message-
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [ma
Folks: We're all smart people here. Most of us have spent many years
working with the law of government and religion. Few of us have real
difficulty grasping concepts. We may disagree with others'
interpretation of those concepts, of course, but that's a different
matter.
It's certainly quite
My answer to Eugene's question would probably depend on what makes the
religious sermon in his hypothetical a "sermon." If the only reason he
characterizes something as a sermon is that it is a speech on a
religious topic, I would view this as a speech clause issue. If it is a
sermon because it is
I guess I don't understand the difference between "speech on a religious topic" and a "religious service." The "services" I attend most Sundays involve announcements (speech about upcoming events), singing (praise and worship songs), and a sermon (i.e. a lecture). The only difference between a typi
I don't recall if this was previously posted, or perhaps a story about
the case in earlier stages of the proceedings had been posted. Sorry for
any duplication.
From: http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1132308316504
Wiccan Lawsuit May Spell Toil, Taxes and Trouble for Fla. Justices
Carl Jones
Eugene wrote on 11/21/2005 11:18:15 AM:
> For instance, does it mean "Congress shall make no law totally
> prohibiting all religion, so that no religion may be practiced"?
If so,
> Congress could outlaw Catholicism, on the theory that it's not
> prohibiting religion generally, only one religion.
Why would a Rotary Club in Nebraska sing "Yellow Rose of Texas?"
That song is considered part of the Texas religion down here, by the way.
More seriously, Mr. Duncan points from the other side to a solution that I think is often available for religious speakers in secular settings. There a
I'm delighted to hear that Cornhusker Rotarians are singing
The Yellow Rose of Texas.
The Dallas Independent School District had (still has?) a
"facially neutral" rule that they would rent their buildings to community groups
any time except Sunday mornings. There was some controversy a cou
Alan Brownstein writes:
> My answer to Eugene's question would probably depend on what
> makes the religious sermon in his hypothetical a "sermon." If
> the only reason he characterizes something as a sermon is
> that it is a speech on a religious topic, I would view this
> as a speech clause
In a message dated 11/21/2005 1:43:11 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I'm delighted to hear that Cornhusker Rotarians are
singing The Yellow Rose of Texas.
The Dallas Independent School District had (still has?) a
"facially neutral" rule that they would ren
A similar case has recently been filed in Georgia. See
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2005/11/aclu-challenges-sales-tax-exe
mption.html
*
Howard M. Friedman
Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus
University of Toledo College of Law
Toledo, OH 43606-3390
Phone:
>From the description, these cases seem to be controlled by Texas
Monthly. Am I missing something?
Douglas Laycock
University of Texas Law School
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78705
512-232-1341 (phone)
512-471-6988 (fax)
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[E
I couldn't call up that link but here's another one.
http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/nation/13180924.htm
Christine Corcos
Associate Professor of Law
Faculty Graduate Studies Program Supervisor
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University
Associate Professor, Women's and Gender Studies Pr
Believe it or not, Doug and Ed, I once spoke to the local rotary club (at the request of the Dean) and we did indeed sing the Yellow Rose of Texas and (I think) God Bless America. Although I strongly support equal access, I don't think it is necessarily unreasonable for school boards to come u
I thought the same thing. But perhaps the
question on appeal is this:
In Texas Monthly, the Court held that the
discrimination was unconstitutional, but remanded the case to the state courts
to decide the state-law (severability) question of whether the proper "remedy"
was extension of
My e-mail program seems to have truncated the link. Try
this one:
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2005/11/aclu-challenges-sales-tax-exe
mption.html
*
Howard M. Friedman
Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus
University of Toledo
College of Law
The lower court ruled 2-1 that Wiccan didn't have standing because it
benefited from the exemption. Here's the language.
"In the instant case, Wiccan's constitutional challenge is that, based
on the reasoning found in Texas Monthly, the Florida sales tax exemption
benefits religion. The parties h
OK, so I should have read the court of appeals'
opinion before posting. I was close, but no cigar.
The opinion (898 So. 2d 134) isn't terribly clear
about the procedural posture, but it seems to be this:
The Wiccans sued because an administrative official
denied the church a renewal of i
This suggests the press accounts weren't even close.
Doesn't sound like a Texas Monthly case now.
Douglas Laycock
University of Texas Law
School
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78705
512-232-1341
(phone)
512-471-6988
(fax)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
According to the story (I haven't read the opinions), the case began
when the Wiccan Religous Cooperative of Florida filed suit claiming that
the Fla Dept of Revenue "improperly denied its renewal application for a
sales and use tax exemption." The judge granted the Revenue Dep'ts
motion for summar
Marty’s hypothetical raises the issue
which arose n the Scientology auditing tax cases-did the scientologist believers
have standing to challenge the fact that the IRS allowed more mainline churches
exemptions for pew rentals but not the scientologists for auditing. Justice Marshall
in Hern
Professor Laycock,
Without use of the word "totally" I understand the meaning of "prohibiting"
as meaning totally. I do not find a different definition of what "prohibiting"
means in Webster's. I do find a difference between the meaning of "abridging"
and "prohibiting." The two words are not t
Some interpretations: Congress cannot forbid the free exercise of religionCongress cannot stop all exercise of religionCongress may limit the exercise of religionCongress may limit the exercise of religion in any way it wants so long as it doesn't prohibit itCongress is forbidden from regulating r
Gene Garmin says:
"Too bad Madison did not leave specific commentary as to the significance
of the use of the different words "prohibiting" and "abridging" in the same
First Amendment. I guess he figured most Americans would understand the meaning
of the words used or would use Webste
Isn't the key question whether the public schools rent to groups 52
weeks/year for long periods of time? Many of the church-planting
initiatives involve using the school the entire weekend, or at least almost all
of Sunday. The use here looks a lot more intense than any other group that
I
Some districts here in Texas have looked on these arrangements as good money makers. The churches pay reasonable rent, plus fees to cover the overtime for custodial people and other building management; many of the hourly workers involved are happy for the hours and extra money. Contracts, or lic
A relatively brief response that does not do justice to Eugene's
thoughtful comments -- but it is all I have time for right now.
Eugene and I agree in a sense on at least one point, I think. We agree
that under his interpretation of the free speech and religion clauses,
religion specific accommoda
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