In response to Marci, my point wasn't that the accommodation was too narrow but
rather that it was tailored or skewed in a way that made the law not "neutral
and generally applicable." I don't think Smith was correctly decided, but even
under Smith such a skewed exception subjects the law to str
I would include AL under the list of state rfras, since it is the same language
(minus "substantial" before "burden"), and was debated in AL explicitly as a
state rfra.? Obviously, its repeal would be different, but it has the same
effect in the cases (though state rfras are invoked precious few
Thanks for the scorecard. It is helpful!
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2007 2:33 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Michigan RFRA?
Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public
Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public Schools, 261 Mich.App. 17, 680
N.W.2d 62 (2004), seems to adopt the Sherbert/Yoder strict scrutiny
model as a matter of Michigan constitutional law. On the other hand, it
relies on an earlier state supreme court decision that rested on a
hybrid rights Free Exerc
What you are missing is that baseline here is that the government certainly can
decline to accommodate. I fully understand that the question posed by Mark was
whether the accommodation was too narrow; my response was that it defies common
sense to look at the particular accommodation from that
There are 13 state rfras; Michigan is not one of them.?
Marci
Marci A. Hamilton
Visiting Professor of Public Affairs
Kathleen and Martin Crane Senior Research Fellow
Program in Law and Public Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
-Original Message-
From: Ed Brayton <[EM
