It came with a .dat file attached.
Frances Paterson, J.D., Ed.D.
Professor
Department of Curriculum, Leadership, and Technology
College of Education
Valdosta State University
Valdosta, GA 31698-0090
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Eugene,
I draw a distinction between protests outside clinics providing abortion
services (and picketing by labor unions outside a store to change the store's
labor policies) and the funeral protests here because the former examples
involve speech directed at a specific audience who the speake
I appreciate Randy's point about the risk of juror viewpoint
discrimination. Yet libel law requires the jury to find -- as
objectively as it can -- whether the statement is factually false, and
the speaker's recklessness or negligence as to falsehood (as to
statements on matters of public
The premise of libel law is that false statements of fact lack
constitutional value. That's why it's OK to award compensatory damages
in private figure / public concern cases based on negligence. (Punitive
damages in any public concern case, including a private figure case,
require reckle
Were it libel, the case would (as I suggested in my comment) likely be a
private libel governed by Gertz (negligence and not actual malice.
Randy Bezanson
Univ. of Iowa
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Saturday, November
isn't this a case of private plaintiffs? Do you need to show actual
malice in private libel? I don't think so, and it is still
constitutional.
Steve
On 11/3/07, Bezanson, Randall P <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Unless I'm mistaken, I think the constitutional narrow tailoring and
> compelling in
1) Rowan, it seems to me, upheld the law precisely because a person
could use the law to block further transmissions of *any* speech,
whether sexually pandering or not. "Both the absoluteness of the
citizen's right under 4009 and its finality are essential; what may not
be provocative to one pers
I appreciate Mark's thoughts, but have a few follow-up
questions:
(1) Can it really for First Amendment purposes matter that
there are multiple abortions at a clinic -- all of which are being
equally criticized by the speakers -- and only one funeral at a time?
(2) What
Alan: What if a town enacted an ordinance that prohibited the
display of signs or banners that held those who get abortions up to
contempt or ridicule (or expressed the message that they deserved to be
punished by God) within 1000 feet of an abortion clinic? Would that be
treated the same way
My sense is that it's not possible to distinguish "that which
offends" from "that which causes pain," but if someone wants to come up
with a proposal, I'd love to hear it. Indeed, part of the problem is
that so many people quite plausibly argue that so many different things
-- flagburning, bla
It seems to me that the analysis below further illustrates the
mushiness of the concept of "public concern," at least as it's often
used. Consider, for instance, "God punished your son because of
America's wrongdoing." That's a message about alleged religious truth,
about what policies th
I think Eugene's point about ambiguity and jury behavior is well taken,
but it is worth remembering that the same kinds of "unknowns" exist in
public libel cases. Indeed, some are of the view (reasonable I think)
that the actual malice standard exacerbates the problem by firing
juror's feelings wi
Unless I'm mistaken, I think the constitutional narrow tailoring and
compelling interest ideas are accomplished in public libel cases by the
requirements of actual malice and proven falsity. In IIED I suppose
those requirements could by analogy be satisfied by a form of specific
intent to inflict
For what it's worth, a procedure used in many libel cases is to
bifurcate the jury findings, asking first the questions of falsity
concerning the plaintiff and reputational harm, and thereafter the
question of actual malice (if a public libel case), or knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of
I think the speech here simply was not protected by the First Amendment,
because it falls within the fighting words exception. Assuming that is true (or
that this speech is unprotected under some other exception analogous to
fighting words), is the application of the First Amendment an issue ini
IIED can be treated just like defamation and not protected by free
speech, though Eugene would not want it treated like that.
Or this can be (properly in my view) viewed as mixed conduct and
speech and regulated by modest extension of time place and manner and
secondary effects doctrines -- easy e
I share people's sense that this sort of funeral picketing is
outrageous, and, as I've said before, I think a content-neutral
restriction on picketing right in front of a funeral (and perhaps within
a small bubble around it) may well be constitutional under Frisby. But
I'm puzzled by peopl
I agree with Marci about one thing: This was indeed outrageous; the
"allegedly" was an inartful way to cover the possibility of IIED
applying to several hypotheticals at once ("If there were a half dozen
people standing on the street corner near the funeral talking to each
other, the attendees
I strongly disagree with Eugene here. It's not the speech per se, but
rather the location of the speech that is outrageous. And this speech in its
chosen location in particular is not "allegedly" outrageous, but rather
outrageous on every meter known to civilized individuals. Death is w
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