When a new TRFRA was introduced in Texas earlier this year, I was told that
there was a letter submitted signed by approximately 16 law professors
who supported the removal of substantial from the typical RFRA analysis.
Doug had said on this list that he would send it to me several months ago,
I assume this is the letter, although it does not specifically address the
removal of substantial:
http://txvalues.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Professor-Support-Texas-Religious-Freedom-Amedment-Senate-version.pdf
On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:03 AM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
When a new TRFRA
Thanks Marty!
Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-0215
http://sol-reform.com
-Original Message-
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
To: Law Religion
The presence or absence of the word substantial was briefly addressed in a
follow-up letter here:
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/laycock/texasreligfreedamdt2013senate2corrected.pdf
I defended the word's omission. I also suggested that the Committee add it if
they thought it mattered.
Thanks for the kind comment, Nelson. While the contraceptive coverage in this
case may not cost the employer anything, and the Court could limit its holding
in this case to those particular facts, I think there is a somewhat broader,
but still fairly limited, way to conceptualize this case.
I've been thinking some more about the argument that the
Establishment Clause forbids any RFRA-based religious exemptions from the
employer mandate, on the grounds that such exemptions would impose an
unacceptable burden on employees who would thus have to (say) pay for
