Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

In Cutter, the Court starts its analysis by flatly stating that the Establishment Clause commands a separation of Church and State. Given the considerable effort in conservative legal circles to discredit the separation doctrine,* how notable do people think it is that Chief Justice Rehnquist and

RE: Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

degree of accommodation. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: Jim Oleske [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:21 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cutter and the Separation of Church and State In Cutter

Re: Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

Coyle, Dennis wrote: If we read separation to forbid a national church, all justices would agree. If we read it to mean no discriminatory treatment in favor of a specific religious group, or no policies specifically designed to advance a particular denomination, the conservatives would still

Cutter and the Separation of Church and State

Prof. Coyle writes that one answer is semantic: conservatives read 'separation' more narrowly. It is certainly true that some justices read separation more narrowly than others. Indeed, even in Everson, where the Court first embraced the idea that the Establishment Clause requires a separation