Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-30 Thread grarpamp
Also as I think Wayne pointed out, using -c isn't very common in the first place. transfer. The delay due to I/O wait is going to be orders of magnitude higher than any reasonable hash computation. In a parallel life, I also mirrored some websites generated from database backends. For

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-29 Thread Jason Haar
Besides all this, what is the performance impact of -c? If it's moved from MD5 to X - will that impact performance? I've never used -c as I trust size+dates - probably like 99.9% of rsync users out there. I always ignored -c as I *assumed* it would come at an appreciable performance hit...

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-29 Thread Kyle Lanclos
Jason Haar wrote: Besides all this, what is the performance impact of -c? If it's moved from MD5 to X - will that impact performance? The major impact of using checksums is that both the client and the server now need to read out every file inspected by the rsync session, where before they

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-28 Thread Matt McCutchen
On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 22:33 -0400, Benjamin R. Haskell wrote: But the flip side is that rsync is not a security tool. MD5 is fine for rsync for the same reason SHA-1 (which, as with all hashes, will eventually be broken) is fine for git: This gets a little off topic, but I /do/ want git to

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-28 Thread Benjamin R. Haskell
On Tue, 28 Sep 2010, Matt McCutchen wrote: On Mon, 2010-09-27 at 22:33 -0400, Benjamin R. Haskell wrote: But the flip side is that rsync is not a security tool. MD5 is fine for rsync for the same reason SHA-1 (which, as with all hashes, will eventually be broken) is fine for git: This gets

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-27 Thread grarpamp
Yes, right now rsync -c is not good if an attacker has had the opportunity to plant files on the destination and you want to make sure the files get updated properly, but that's an uncommon use case Or whitehat people backing up cracked boxes. Or anyhat people backing up data generated from

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-27 Thread Paul Slootman
On Mon 27 Sep 2010, grarpamp wrote: Yes, right now rsync -c is not good if an attacker has had the opportunity to plant files on the destination and you want to make sure the files get updated properly, but that's an uncommon use case Or whitehat people backing up cracked boxes. If I

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-27 Thread grarpamp
If Ad nauseum... to each shall entertain their own use case scenarios. The overall point is that MD5 is not suitable for data integrity beyond it's known [and unknown] weaknesses. I've no faith in an algorithm with such freely generatable collisions to not have other collisions/rot with any of

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-27 Thread Benjamin R. Haskell
On Mon, 27 Sep 2010, grarpamp wrote: If Ad nauseum... to each shall entertain their own use case scenarios. The overall point is that MD5 is not suitable for data integrity beyond it's known [and unknown] weaknesses. But the flip side is that rsync is not a security tool. MD5 is fine for

Re: recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-26 Thread Matt McCutchen
On Fri, 2010-09-24 at 00:31 -0400, grarpamp wrote: [rsync -c fails to copy a file with an MD5 collision] Yes, right now rsync -c is not good if an attacker has had the opportunity to plant files on the destination and you want to make sure the files get updated properly, but that's an uncommon

recent discussion regarding 'checksums'

2010-09-23 Thread grarpamp
Hi. Wanted to add something. There was recent talk about the use of 'checksums' by rsync to determine how or what parts of a file to copy. Something like that. Anyways, it just so happens that I have a number of files here that rsync completely fails to update... l -isT */* ; md5 -r */* ; sha1