Several posters have replied recommending you use Ettercap. I strongly urge
you NOT to do this if you are on a corporate network. Ettercap attempts to
defeat the normal behavior of the switched environment using something
called "arp poisoning" to trick hosts on the switch into sending you their
I have run both Checkpoint and PIX in my environment. I have seen some of
the "classified" documents you are referring to - look at the source. I
believe they are marketing documents from Checkpoint or Nokia.
The PIX is a true stateful inspection firewall. No "weird" ports have to be
open for E
I had started to type up what I thought VNC does on login; then I decided to
simply post this link. It should answer any question about security around
the initial authentication:
http://www.uk.research.att.com/vnc/faq.html#q55
-Original Message-
From: Chris Berry [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECT
Your company simply cannot respect the privacy of its employees with respect
to E-Mails sent through your own E-Mail servers. Employees should be
required to read and sign off on acceptance of an E-Mail policy, in which it
should be made crystal clear that their communications using corporate
reso
I'm not sure understand the question. You mean having the same box acting as
both a DMZ FTP server and also an endpoint for VPN tunnels? That's
seriously complicating things. Primary rule for security: simplify. If
you can't figure out the implications of doing something, you probably can't
sec
You have received a lot of replies to this already, but I have a slightly
different take on this. The message says the traffic is sourced from port
80 and coming back to a high port on your end that would normally be in the
range used by client software (like a web browser). There actually does
ap
