"The point where I currently disagree with Rob and Randy is on the
granularity of the timer. Whatever granularity is chosen bounds the
maximum signing rate. Thus, if you use a 1-second clock, you can't
sign more than 1 object/sec. (Well, you can cheat and "borrow" from
future seconds, up to the
On Apr 26, 2010, at 10:24 PM, Rob Austein wrote:
I'm writing to propose that we remove all use and mention of TLS from
the RPKI "up-down" protocol described in the (expired) draft
draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning.
I would like to second this.
Background: In June 2007 we had a team of
On Mon, 26 Apr 2010, Warren Kumari wrote:
While going through back mail I noticed this and that there seems to be no
followups.
That's because there's been no official call for adoption.
And that is because the request is motivated by a reference in another
document that is not itself a work
> Randy, could you confirm that you would like to see this adopted by
> the working group without respect to the status of the other document?
i confirm that we submitted draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol as a wg
document irrespective of the status of draft-pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate
(which should be o
My apologies. I'll get right on this.
--Sandy
On Tue, 27 Apr 2010, Randy Bush wrote:
Randy, could you confirm that you would like to see this adopted by
the working group without respect to the status of the other document?
i confirm that we submitted draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol as a wg
d
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi
> As one of the participants in the testbed, I'd like to chime in here
> --getting the TLS config correct is really hard, and troubleshooting
> that various failure modes is seriously non-trivial.
I'll admit that I'm one of the testbed participant
Hi, Geoff
At Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:07:30 +1000, Geoff Huston wrote:
>
> I dug out the original exchange from 3 June 2007 and I think you were
> proposing some complications to the mechanism at the time
No doubt. Thanks for the archives, I had forgotten some of the
details, but I still think t
On 27/04/10 12:24 PM, "Rob Austein" wrote:
> I'm writing to propose that we remove all use and mention of TLS from
> the RPKI "up-down" protocol described in the (expired) draft
> draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning.
>
I second this given my observations from October last year
(http://www.
three weeks ago I asked:
>
> It seems to me that the essential requirements for securing proxy aggregation
> are missing at this stage, which makes it somewhat difficult for SIDR to work
> on mechanisms without some re-spinning of the SIDR WG Charter (or some other
> WG) that would permit the
