Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Russ White
> danny's draft actually does a decent job of saying what a leak is (one > instance of a leak at least, which is fine), it just doesn't say how > you'd know that from 2 as-hops away... (today, with out bgp changes > and/or external knowledge about the ASes in the AS-Path) I came to the conclusion

Re: [sidr] Route Leak fix: V free routing

2011-11-21 Thread michael.meulle
What about using a "BGP community" to set your bit "1/0" and propose mechanisms to sign the communities tagged by an AS? Mickael -Message d'origine- De : sidr-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:sidr-boun...@ietf.org] De la part de Jakob Heitz Envoyé : vendredi 4 novembre 2011 06:18 À : Brian Dick

Re: [sidr] WGLC for draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-03

2011-11-21 Thread Eric Osterweil
On Nov 20, 2011, at 1:56 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Sean Turner wrote: >>> that can not do the 'new hotness' (B in your example) you will have to > > do I have to apologize for the MIB refernce? Absolutely not! I was surprised no one gave you props

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Jakob Heitz
When S sends a packet to D, that packet should traverse only ASs that S trusts OR that D trusts. If the packet traverses an AS that NEITHER S NOR D trusts, then a route leak has occurred. I would generally avoid using packet flow models as a way to describe BGP security issues... The ultimate goa

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Randy Bush
> The solution isn't to rule out such problems because they're > "unsolvable." There are, in fact, at least two systems that can solve > this problem. in the harsh realities such as o a significant portion of the internet's isps will not publish peering and customer business relationships,

Re: [sidr] Route Leak fix: V free routing

2011-11-21 Thread Montgomery, Douglas
These ideas have floated around for 20+ years. They have even appeared in early BGP specs ... See "LINK TYPE" in http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1105.txt. I actually think this is a useful idea, but the discussion always rat holes in the supposition of absolute filtering rules and proof by counter exa

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Russ White
> o a significant portion of the internet's isps will not publish > peering and customer business relationships, You can't secure what you don't tell anyone about. Security is about allowing others to compare the current state against what the state should be. What you're asking for is to a

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Robert Raszuk
>>o a significant portion of the internet's isps will not publish >> peering and customer business relationships, Randy, This is very true statement how every last week we have had a number of conversations where the same significant portions of ISPs expressed very great interest in i

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Shane Amante
Hi Chris, On Nov 20, 2011, at 10:35 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > On Wed, Nov 16, 2011 at 11:23 PM, Danny McPherson wrote: >> >> Team, >> I've updated this draft based on some feedback received already. Given >> the discussion at the WG session, and the list discussion as of late, I'd >> lik

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 6:08 PM, Shane Amante wrote: > Hi Chris, howdy! > On Nov 20, 2011, at 10:35 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 16, 2011 at 11:23 PM, Danny McPherson wrote: >>> >>> Team, >>> I've updated this draft based on some feedback received already.  Given >>> the discuss

Re: [sidr] Origin Ops, TALs and Local TAs

2011-11-21 Thread Danny McPherson
On Nov 16, 2011, at 2:50 AM, Stephen Kent wrote: > >> Here's my primary question. If I wanted to form a 'federation' of sorts for >> resiliency would I have to use additional TALs in conjunction with my >> LTA and paracertificate hierarchy? If so, can an RP include some sort of >> filter to con

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Terry Manderson
Speaking for myself on this one. On 22/11/2011, at 12:47 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > > ok, so if we step forward and ask for 'give me an attribute to > indicate customer/peer/other', would we then trust that? it'd be > (presumably) set per as-hop, is that anymore trustworthy than the > commu

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 11:15 PM, Terry Manderson wrote: > > Speaking for myself on this one. > > On 22/11/2011, at 12:47 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >> >> ok, so if we step forward and ask for 'give me an attribute to >> indicate customer/peer/other', would we then trust that? it'd be >> (presu

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Terry Manderson
On 22/11/2011, at 3:13 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > > 'if it is intended' ... means: > a) "is intended to be seen at the vantage point it was observed at" > (3 as-hops away) > b) "with the as-path it shows up with" (isp1 - as1 - isp2 - me) > c) something else? > > it's not clear what you

Re: [sidr] Route Leaks and BGP Security

2011-11-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Terry Manderson wrote: > > On 22/11/2011, at 3:13 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > >> >> 'if it is intended' ... means: >>  a) "is intended to be seen at the vantage point it was observed at" >> (3 as-hops away) >>  b) "with the as-path it shows up with" (isp1 - as