Oops: s/BGPSEC_Path_Signature/BGPSEC_Path_Signatures/
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On 4/6/2012 2:10 PM, Murphy, Sandra wrote:
So where's the dos attack?
(Do note that the bgpsec signatures would detect this at the first point that
checked the signatures, so your neighbor would have spotted the injection -
unless it was the source of the injection.)
So I think I finally see
Speaking as regular ol' member
Shane, I'm having some trouble following your argument.
Here's what I think you are saying.
You are exploring options for dropping an update based on detecting a loop -
whether the loop detection should be before or after the check of the path
signatures.
If you
On Apr 6, 2012, at 10:20 AM, Andrew Chi wrote:
> On 4/6/2012 11:21 AM, Shane Amante wrote:
>> a) BGP performs loop detection on the AS_PATH attribute *before* verifying
>> any BGPSEC_Path_Signature, in which case you drop the UPDATE, thus causing a
>> DoS because you're not propagating what *ma
On 4/6/2012 11:21 AM, Shane Amante wrote:
a) BGP performs loop detection on the AS_PATH attribute *before* verifying any
BGPSEC_Path_Signature, in which case you drop the UPDATE, thus causing a DoS
because you're not propagating what *may* be legitimate reachability info
further downstream.
On Apr 6, 2012, at 8:26 AM, Andrew Chi wrote:
> On 3/29/2012 9:04 AM, Shane Amante wrote:
>> Regardless, I think
>> that its best to acknowledge, in this draft, that there is a threat of
>> DoS to the availability of the BGP control plane
>
> Maybe I'm missing something.
>
> Intermediate routers
On 3/29/2012 9:04 AM, Shane Amante wrote:
Regardless, I think
that its best to acknowledge, in this draft, that there is a threat of
DoS to the availability of the BGP control plane
Maybe I'm missing something.
Intermediate routers or MITM entities can always drop updates. If
BGPSEC is enabl
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of
the IETF.
Title : Securing RPSL Objects with RPKI Signatures
Author(s) : Robert Kisteleki
