Re: [Standards] Multimegasmarticasting

2014-06-25 Thread Philipp Hancke
[...] I slightly disagree here. But not enough anymore to really object. I would dearly love you to disagree here. Not only because I'd rather like to be wrong, but it'd be just like the good old days - and in any case, I'd rather get the debate aired rather than raised later. Well, I was

Re: [Standards] Multimegasmarticasting

2014-06-24 Thread Winfried Tilanus
On 24-06-14 00:03, Dave Cridland wrote: c) Metadata tracking by traffic analysis seems to be a valid threat; a suitable design would homogenise traffic to a degree, which might reduce the data one can glean from an encrypted session. Right.

[Standards] Multimegasmarticasting

2014-06-23 Thread Dave Cridland
Since use of XEP-0033 for more efficient S2S has reared its ugly head once more, I thought I'd try tackling this problem from a different direction. We've rejected a number of designs (around 6 or 7) over the years aimed at solving this general problem - sending multiple stanzas to a set of jids

Re: [Standards] Multimegasmarticasting

2014-06-23 Thread Philipp Hancke
[...] The converse of these - bandwidth efficient, secure/private, RTT efficient - would form our requirements. makes sense. I'd note a couple of changes to the server landscape might affect our thoughts here. a) As annoying as it is to me, compression seems related to a number of security

Re: [Standards] Multimegasmarticasting

2014-06-23 Thread Dave Cridland
On 23 June 2014 21:15, Philipp Hancke fi...@goodadvice.pages.de wrote: [...] The converse of these - bandwidth efficient, secure/private, RTT efficient - would form our requirements. makes sense. I'd note a couple of changes to the server landscape might affect our thoughts here.