Hi,
Roman Zeyde:
Adding `minimodem` [1] would allow air-gapped communication between Tails and
other machines.
That sounds like a very special use case to me. But you can install
minimodem via the Additional Software:
https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/additional_software/index.e
[sending again because I replied to the tails-dev list only]
Hi,
Richard Pospesel:
Tor Browser 12.0.7 release candidate builds are now available for testing:
-
https://tb-build-05.torproject.org/~ma1/builds/release/unsigned/12.0.6-build1/
Thanks for letting us know!
There is currently no
Hi,
Richard Pospesel:
Tor Browser 12.0.7 release candidate builds are now available for testing:
-
https://tb-build-05.torproject.org/~ma1/builds/release/unsigned/12.0.6-build1/
Thanks for letting us know!
There is currently no detached signature for
sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt in that
Hi,
sajolida:
In March, emmapeel traveled to Ecuador and conducted moderated in-person
usability tests of the new Persistent Storage.
https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/18648
She recruited 4 women from feminist groups who had an interest in
privacy technologies but never used T
David A. Wheeler:
You might want to try `torsocks --isolate curl` (I didn't test it but that's
often enough to make any program use Tor).
Currently torsocks is never mentioned in the Tails user documentation,
so a typical Tails user has a good chance of not knowing about it. (yes,
torsocks *i
ght want to try `torsocks --isolate curl` (I didn't test it but
that's often enough to make any program use Tor).
You can also make Tails install curl automatically via the Additional
Software feature.
Cheers
segfault
___
Tails-dev mailin
Topi Toosi:
Hi,
As a user I would be slightly worried if a user level script would be
able to silently activate and start using persistence features I
specifically have not enabled.
Currently there is some assurance that data related to one Tails session
will not be written to the persiste
Hey,
as part of the rewrite of the Persistent Storage settings (#17803), I
also want to solve #11529 "Save data to Persistence when it is created
(no need to restart)".
The only way I see to solve this while providing a nice UX is to rewrite
part of live-persist (and the live-boot functions us
Hi,
kirg...@riseup.net:
> Why does Tails default to overwriting with random data (instead of ones
> and zeros) ? When erasing files.
I'm not sure, but what issue do you see with the current behavior?
Cheers
___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.org
emma peel:
> ey there, a user reported this typo, please merge if you fancy:
>
> https://git-tails.immerda.ch/emmapeel/tails/commit/?h=another_typo&id=60829a0ad8a5c1f597b0f99255191dcde08c1736
>
> thanks, and thanks to the user that reported.
Merged, thanks!
__
anonym:
> As release managers, one of the things we produce is the changelog
(i.e. debian/changelog; we are *not* talking about the release notes).
We have the following questions for you, potential users of this file:
>
> - Do you read the changelog at all?
To be honest, no, I don't remember eve
thenerdyanarchist--- via Tails-dev:
> I had asked in the XMPP chat, but just figured I'd send a message here to
> cover all bases. Did anyone from the team create an account named
> Tails_OS on Reddit yesterday at around 18:00 UTC?
>
> Since I haven't found any evidence that it's anyone from the
x27;re done with the
>> implementation and tested that it works, set the ticket fields according
>> to the merge policy (Status -> Needs Validation, Assignee -> empty).
>
> Since then, touss created themselves a Redmine account, and I give
> them "Contributor" s
Hi,
> I've been meaning to contribute to Tais since i went to the 2017 Cryptorave
> at Sao Paulo, and finally now i had some time to start. I implemented a
> bugfix to bug 15102 wich can be found at my branch at Salsa:
> https://salsa.debian.org/touss-guest/persistence-setup/tree/bugfix/15102
u:
>>> 2. Gather initial input from everyone (not just members of the
>>>working group)
>>
>>>→ Feel free to send me, by the end of July, a list of statements
>>>such as "I think feature X / application Y should be part of the
>>>core Tails system because $REASONS" or the opposite.
u:
>>> 2. Gather initial input from everyone (not just members of the
>>>working group)
>>
>>>→ Feel free to send me, by the end of July, a list of statements
>>>such as "I think feature X / application Y should be part of the
>>>core Tails system because $REASONS" or the opposite.
x27;s plate [...] »
>>
>> It definitely is part of our job. segfault asked me for guidance
>> a couple weeks ago wrt. how to handle this and I replies. I suspect
>> this fell through the cracks since. segfault, are you still on it?
Yes, it fell through the cracks, and yes
Hi,
intrigeri:
> anonym:
>> intrigeri:
>>> Given we now have "mentions" (@nickname) on our Redmine, for the
>>> majority of cases, when the requested info can presumably be provided
>>> cheaply and quickly, I think we should use mentions and not reassign
>>> the ticket. And when I'm mentioned, if
Hi,
Ron HulduNet - GM:
> amd64 3.13
>
> Lenovo Thinkpad X200 Tablet
>
> Sandisk 16GB
>
>
> Starts booting then stops at
> BusyBox <...>
>
> (initramfs) Unable to find a medium containing a live file system
how did you install Tails? Did you use the .iso or the .img? And did
Tails fail to boo
sajolida:
> u:
>> We know from Javascript statistics of our download page that roughly
>> ~20% of the downloads of Tails images are verified by users using the
>> verification extension. The optional OpenPGP verification accounts for
>> 9% of downloads (computed using the number of downloads of the
Hi,
s7r:
> Or, if there are any downsides that prevent us from using the AppImage,
> (I hope there won't be any as it seams our easiest move here),
There is at least one downside: the Electrum AppImage is 86 MiB, whereas
the Electrum Debian package and it's dependencies which we could remove
fro
Hi,
sajolida:
> Summary of the situation
>
> [...]
Thanks a lot for the comprehensive summary!
This sounds like a serious issue. I share your concern regarding losing
users (and good donors). So I think we should avoid removing Electrum
without at least documenting a wor
Hi,
thanks for the report.
bradley--- via Tails-dev:
> Hey,
>
> Thanks for all the work you put into Tails. It is an amazing system and I
> find it very useful.
>
> I would like to report one issue however. Every second time I boot Tails,
> it fails. It either displays some errors in the comman
Hi!
VeraCrypt Team:
> We have no problem with you reusing VeraCrypt logo in Tails. The logo
> itself is licensed under Apache License 2.0. I don't know if this can
> help integrate it into Tails. In case of problem, we can make
> exceptions for you.
That's great! But after some more discussions,
hi,
emma peel:
> as now we are having so many possibilities with the new Additional Software
> feature coming, with some friends we are working on some apps that can be
> used in Tails.
>
> We have a nice .deb package for newbie users to be able to install a small
> catalogue of tools, but we
Hi,
first a quick status update: the project to add VeraCrypt support to
GNOME made good progress in the last months. Our work on Disks, glib,
GVfs, and partly GTK+, was merged already:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-disk-utility/issues/84
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/merge_reque
Hi,
Vaas !:
> We are glad to let your Team know that we were working on the Debian
> Repository in the last months with our Development Team and we did a lot of
> progress on it. We took your words about doing something first as a way to
> earn the trust from your members and who that we want to h
gaff-tails:
> Is there a way I can create and mount a persistent volume that isn't
on a USB stick? I understand that this comes with security risks - My
main aim here is develop and test tails features using virtual box or
similar.
For testing purposes, you can also use this tool to create a disk
Hi,
segfault:
> We are currently working on the patches for the unlock dialog in Disks.
> This will probably be finished soon. The resulting UI is much more
> complex than in the LUKS case, but this simply reflects the more complex
> needs of VeraCrypt users.
the Disks patches a
Hi,
segfault:
> Hi,
>
> we at Tails (tails.boum.org) currently work on integrating support for
> unlocking VeraCrypt (and probably also TrueCrypt) volumes in Tails via
> udisks2 and GNOME Disks (and maybe also GNOME Files and the GVfs
> monitor). We internally track the status
forgottenbeast:
>
>> 1. The size of the docker images. The debian base image is > 100MB.
>> Downloading this would increase both the service installation time and
>> the requirements on the system's RAM.
>
> This problem can easily be circumvented by using alpine based images:
> the alpine base i
Hi,
forgottenbeast:
> Greetings,
> I've been following the announcements about tails server and I would
> like to know if there are any plans regarding the support of docker
> containers?
>
> The use case I am thinking about would be the ability to pull a docker
> image and run it as a hidden ser
Hi,
intrigeri:
> Hi,
>
> intrigeri:
>> FYI Mozilla has changed their 2018 release schedule. I'll update our
>> own calendar + Redmine, and will come back to this thread later.
>
> Here we go (sorry for the noise, I didn't think I would do it
> immediately):
>
> * 2018-01-23: Release 3.4? (Fir
.. ink ..:
> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 10:02 PM, segfault wrote:
>
>
>> We do not plan to support creating new TC/VC containers, and I didn't
>> even know that zulucrypt can do this (thanks for the hint!). I find the
>> idea tempting, maybe I will work on that at
Vratislav Podzimek:
> On Tue, 2017-11-14 at 17:36 +0900, Kai Lüke wrote:
> [...]
>> * GNOME Disks and GIO/GVFs need to make use of the keyfiles parameter in
>> UDisks (currently lacking for LUKS as well) and a way to select a
>> keyfile from GNOME Shell is needed. One could also decide to explicitl
Vratislav Podzimek:
> On Mon, 2017-11-13 at 17:36 +0100, segfault wrote:
> [...]
>> I forgot to add: Assuming that you would like to have this in upstream,
>> some heads up for when it would be ideal for us if an upstream
>> maintainer was available for reviewing:
>>
Hi,
thanks for the quick reply! I re-add the tails-dev mailinglist to Cc.
Kai Lüke:
> Seems I misunderstood while reading, so you already have code.
Correct. Sorry if I didn't make that clear enough. I will still answer
your previous email below. In case you already want to have a look at
the cu
Hey,
thanks for the quick response!
Bastien Nocera:
> [...]
> What UI differences would be needed to handle those different types of
> encryption? I'm guessing none for handling encrypted disks, because the
> UI should be pretty much the same as for the existing LVM based
> encryption support.
D
segfault:
> Hi,
>
> we at Tails (tails.boum.org) currently work on integrating support for
> unlocking VeraCrypt (and probably also TrueCrypt) volumes in Tails via
> udisks2 and GNOME Disks (and maybe also GNOME Files and the GVfs
> monitor). We internally track the status of th
Hi,
we at Tails (tails.boum.org) currently work on integrating support for
unlocking VeraCrypt (and probably also TrueCrypt) volumes in Tails via
udisks2 and GNOME Disks (and maybe also GNOME Files and the GVfs
monitor). We internally track the status of this work in [1] and [2].
Currently we are
I just noticed that the logo looks broken on every page under
tails.boum.org/install/ (see attached screenshot).
I suspect that this has something to do with the "Removing the subtitle
in our logo" threat, maybe a test version was accidentally pushed to master?
Cheers!
___
sajolida:
> Testing VeraCrypt right now I see that on the main window there is an
> option to "Mount" (which requires first selecting a file or device) but
> also an option to "Auto-Mount Devices" (which autodetects my VeraCrypt
> partition). segfault, I think you
Hi,
so I finally read this thread, after having already learned via XMPP
that the release schedule was changed and that my plans will not work
out the way I thought they would. I too somehow thought that this thread
would not be relevant to me. I thought that the releases for the first
half of 201
intrigeri:
> Could you please attach the logs in a pure-text format without
> control chars instead?
Here is an updated patch.
Cheers!
>From 13b587c8167f8b019804c9b32919f98c4c13e412 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: segfault
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2017 20:36:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add Octobe
anonym:
> segfault:
>> Hi,
>>
>> so I started working on the project a few days ago and now I realize
>> that we might have a problem, because TC/VC volumes are undetectable.
>> Unlike LUKS encrypted volumes, TC/VC encrypted volumes don't have a
>> cl
Here are the October meeting notes.
Cheers!
From 3509c2f0689b0a48096abbec24ad692549fb7ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: segfault
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2017 20:36:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add October meeting notes
---
wiki/src/contribute/meetings/201710.mdwn | 39
wiki/src/contribute
Arnaud:
> The failure doesn't always happen at the same point of the build. At
> first, I thought it was related to `apt`, but I also experienced in
> failure on a `curl` command (when downloading Tor Browser, in
> `config/chroot_local-hooks/10-tbb`). I don't have the log anymore, but
> it was also
intrigeri:
> segfault:
>> Hi, here are the notes of today's meeting. Please review and merge.
>
> applied, thanks!
>
> will you update the tickets accordingly in Redmine?
Done!
___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.or
Hi, here are the notes of today's meeting. Please review and merge.
Cheers!
>From 835a9183ed777d727db35afaaa2489a796466a12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: segfault
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2017 22:35:00 +
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] March contributos meeting notes
---
wiki/src/contribute/meeting
Joanna Rutkowska:
> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 06:54:10PM +0000, segfault wrote:
> The added value would be ensuring the unused portion of the disk blocks
> (occupied by the Tails partition) are not populated with some random garbage,
> which might be e.g. user's previous (unencrypt
Hi,
somehow I missed this thread, just noticed it right now.
intrigeri:
> Hi,
>
> thanks Joanna for raising this topic!
>
> I've just thought about it a little bit and I see no technical reason
> that prevents us from resetting all timestamps in the filesystem to
> some fixed value that depends o
Hi everone,
the GSoC ends this week. My goal was to implement the basis of the Tails
Server, which should include a GUI and a CLI to install, configure and
start onion services in Tails. I implemented a prototype which meets
this goal. There are nightly images [1] of Tails including this
prototype
sajolida:
> segfault:
[...]
>> - Write documentation
>
> Where can I see this?
Currently I only have this documentation for the Mumble server:
https://gitlab.com/segfault_/tails/blob/feature/5688-tails-server/wiki/src/doc/tails_server/mumble.mdwn
>> - Make the applicatio
Hi everyone,
this is the fifth status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.
I did two batches of user tests in the last two weeks, with five
participants each. The results were mixed, more skilled users had a
better user experience than less skilled users. I will try to solve the
problems disc
Hi,
George Kadianakis:
> segfault writes:
>
>> [ text/plain ]
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> this is the fourth status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.
>>
>> First off: There are nightly images of Tails with integrated Tails
>> Server available for
sajolida:
> segfault:
>> [1]:
>> http://nightly.tails.boum.org/build_Tails_ISO_feature-5688-tails-server/builds/
>
> That's super cool! I'm downloading one now (and I hope I'll get to test
> it before long)
>
>> * Implement three different ap
Hi everyone,
this is the fourth status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.
First off: There are nightly images of Tails with integrated Tails
Server available for download [1]. Some notes if you want to test it:
- Installation of the first service will take several minutes, because
the APT p
Hi everyone,
this is the third status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.
I had to omit the previous report because personal difficulties were
getting in the way.
So here is what I achieved in the last four weeks:
* Revamp the GUI
* Replace the status panel with a config panel
* Add a
anonym:
[...]
>> Just to clarify things: Currently Tails Server does have a configuration
>> file for each service (which is made persistent if the service is
>> persistent). Those are currently in /usr/share/tails-server/options/,
>> e.g. /usr/share/tails-server/options/mumble. But I only store op
anonym:
> segfault:
>> anonym:
>>> segfault:
>>>> anonym:
>>>>> segfault:
>>> [...]
>>>>>> I wrote some code to make single files persistent by creating a new
>>>>>> directory in TailsData_unlocked, moving th
anonym:
> segfault:
>> anonym:
>>> segfault:
> [...]
>>>> I wrote some code to make single files persistent by creating a new
>>>> directory in TailsData_unlocked, moving the file into it and adding the
>>>> directory to the persisten
sajolida:
> anonym:
>> # add_onion
>>
>> By using stem to communicate with Tor over the control port/socket to
>> add the hidden services, just like onionshare does (which would be a
>> good source for inspiration, code-wise), you don't need any torrc
>> persistence just like in the previous approa
anonym:
> segfault:
>> anonym:
>>> [...]
>>> One thing to note about the mumble-server script is the "little
>>> bind-mount trick" used to workaround Tor's AppArmor confinement. We
>>> won't have that problem, I think. I did that so
anonym:
> [...]
> One thing to note about the mumble-server script is the "little
> bind-mount trick" used to workaround Tor's AppArmor confinement. We
> won't have that problem, I think. I did that so that all things we want
> to make persistent for mumble-server lives in the same directory on the
Hi everyone,
this is the second status report on the Tails Server GSoC project.
In the last two weeks I worked on these things:
* Discussing the design of the GUI on the Tails-UX mailing list. I sent
the last prototype of the GUI two weeks ago and we have been discussing
it since.
* Write a spe
sajolida:
> segfault:
>> I sent my first GSoC report only to tor-dev and forgot to send it to
>> tails-dev too. I quote it in full at the end of this mail.
>
> I'll answer on tails-dev only and add George in explicit copy to avoid
> crossposting across mailing list.
intrigeri:
> Is anyone here excited in working on this topic?
I am, but I have a lot of other things to do :/
Maybe in late summer I will have time for this.
>
> Personally, I'd much rather see work towards having TrueCrypt volumes
> supported in udisks2 and GNOME Disks, than adding a second GU
I sent my first GSoC report only to tor-dev and forgot to send it to
tails-dev too. I quote it in full at the end of this mail.
sajolida:
> segfault:
>> this is the first status report on the Tails Server GSoC project. I
>> officially began working on it on April 25th, althoug
Hi,
> At 32C3 we got quite inspired by the Tor presentation about onion
> services and started reviewing the plan we had on the Tails Server
> blueprint [0] with segfault.
>
> [0]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/server_edition/
>
> The Tails Server project has been on hol
t suite https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/7729
+- ticketbot: Tails ⺠Feature #10721: Improve automated GUI testing robustness using "GUI aware" technologies https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/10721
+- segfault: I will have more time in the next month than in february. I still want to work on
> I'm not sure how the user could detect / verify that
> (realistically, you probably can't..). Running a rootkit checker from
> another *nix OS may be helpful, but of unknown effectiveness.
That's work in progress: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/7496
I implemented a prototype that's currentl
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