In message <20151024123614.7bbfe...@aluminium.mobile.teply.info>, Florian Teply
writes:
>But if I read that article on ars technica correctly, it looks like it
>is something inherent to the ntp protocol itself and the definitions it
>makes.
Correct.
The article is basically about how
Saw this little module on EEvblog. I suspect not up to the standards for Time
Nuts but nonetheless interesting. Needs to be translated from Spanish to
English.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQwARwRqMQo
http://www.bloguetronica.com/2015/09/modulo-condicionador-de-sinal-sincronos.html
This is
Am 24.10.2015 um 22:21 schrieb Bruce Griffiths:
On Saturday, October 24, 2015 09:03:21 AM Charles Steinmetz wrote:
The spec sheet says both TimePod inputs accept -5 to +20dBm into 50
ohms. -5dBm is less than 0.4Vp-p, which requires less than +/-4mA
from the source, so a 0-5v comparator output
I would be pleased to contribute a 100 MHz wenzel onyx for testing if
that'd be of value. I don't see myself getting to it anytime soon and this
project directly benefits almost half the things on my "never to do but
wish I could" list
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 7:00 PM Bruce Griffiths
I have had to move the HP5065A aside for now, my work needs the
table-space, and this may be some weeks or months before I can
play seriously with it again.
Here is a summary:
A15 (PSU + C-field) is a significant source of temperature and
supply voltage sensitivity.
One simple way to improve on
Am 23.10.2015 um 21:27 schrieb Charles Steinmetz:
Use medium-speed transistors, bias both bases from the same low-noise
voltage reference such as an LM329, capacitively couple the emitters,
and use a higher supply voltage, for starters. I use
This evening, I have measured some oh so noisy
The technique I used to measure the PN contribution of the LTC6957-4 at
10Mhz
Low noise 10MHz sinewave OCXO (Trimble 37265 removed from Thunderbolt
(Thunderbolt has rather noisy output amplifier)). OCXO PN measured
against a pair of similar OCXOs via correlation using the TimepodConnected
to
On Sunday, October 25, 2015 11:56:13 PM Gerhard Hoffmann wrote:
> Am 24.10.2015 um 22:21 schrieb Bruce Griffiths:
> > On Saturday, October 24, 2015 09:03:21 AM Charles Steinmetz wrote:
> >> The spec sheet says both TimePod inputs accept -5 to +20dBm into
50
> >> ohms. -5dBm is less than 0.4Vp-p,
Neil Schroeder writes:
> I would like to respond in a generic and sweeping way - having not read in
> the detail Bob layed out for us required to fully analyze the situation -
> to the notion that circuit level access or prior topological knowledge is
> required to exploit this or any other
In message
Hi
Well here’s one of their points in “Attacking The Network Time Protocol":
They start off in the paper proposing the a KoD packet can be easily
used to disconnect NTP from it’s upstream time sources. Thus forging
KoD’s would appear to be the first step in their proposed attack.
Can you
On Sunday, October 25, 2015 09:21:02 AM Charles Steinmetz wrote:
> I wrote:
> >>According to the simulation, the resistor has no effect on the output
> >>amplitude until it is well below 1k ohms
>
> Bruce replied:
> >even 10k increases the output signal amplitude by 130mV or 2.6%.
> >However that
Am Sun, 25 Oct 2015 13:34:43 +
schrieb Wojciech Owczarek :
> I think this is a classic case of confusing application security with
> network security. The whole idea relies on spoofing packets. A
> spoofing scenario is only realistic in a lab setting. Or in case of a
Am Sun, 25 Oct 2015 07:14:24 +
schrieb "Poul-Henning Kamp" :
>
> In message <20151024123614.7bbfe...@aluminium.mobile.teply.info>,
> Florian Teply writes:
>
> >But if I read that article on ars technica correctly, it looks like
> >it is something inherent to the
The backwards UR logo indicates that the device is recognized under the
Underwriters Laboratories component recognition program.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 25, 2015, at 11:16, Luca Dal Passo wrote:
>
> Hi Joe,
> the part is marked as follow:
>
> mD NK 00
> 6109A RU
>
Hi Joe,
the part is marked as follow:
mD NK 00
6109A RU
The letter R before U, is written as it was seen in a mirror.
Bye
Luca
Il sabato 24 ottobre 2015, J. L. Trantham ha scritto:
> Luca,
>
> Any identifying marks on the part?
>
> Thanks.
>
> Joe
>
> -Original
I wrote:
According to the simulation, the resistor has no effect on the output
amplitude until it is well below 1k ohms
Bruce replied:
even 10k increases the output signal amplitude by 130mV or 2.6%.
However that is smaller than the tilt/sag in the high level output due to
feedthrough via
[This is my final contribution to this topic since real time-nuts using NTP
run their own S1 servers driven by their Thunderbolts (et.seq.) and don't
need to worry about this]
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:27 AM, Florian Teply wrote:
> >
> > >But if I read that article on ars
In message <20151025162731.7a4a7...@aluminium.mobile.teply.info>, Florian Teply
writes:
>Of course proper authentication would make this kind of attack more
>difficult, but as far as I can see, I'd estimate the amount of
>authenticated NTP traffic on the internet to be negligible.
I would like to respond in a generic and sweeping way - having not read in
the detail Bob layed out for us required to fully analyze the situation -
to the notion that circuit level access or prior topological knowledge is
required to exploit this or any other spoofing attack. On a corporation or
I think this is a classic case of confusing application security with
network security. The whole idea relies on spoofing packets. A spoofing
scenario is only realistic in a lab setting. Or in case of a physical
takeover of a circuit, which - well, then you have more important things to
worry
All,
I wish that people had said that the ADCMP600 was a mediocre comparator when I
designed the board - I’d have used a better one!
I can't find the post about the design and die level issues in a quick search
(I've been off line for a few weeks).
Bruce,
I couldn't find your post about
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