Hi
One has to finance retirement somehow :)
It’s also a pretty simple way to demonstrate the what and why of
a spoof without getting into anything so obscure that it can’t be
understood. A secondary point *might* be that indeed, the stuff
we are talking about is mainly useful to “bad guys”.
Bob
On 8/15/17 9:58 AM, Ken Winterling wrote:
Hmmm Bob,
It seems you have given a considerable amount of thought to armored cars,
gold bars, bank vaults, and stock trades... Is there anything you want to
tell us LOL
There's a lot of really neat time-nuts gear out there that's expensive.
Hmmm Bob,
It seems you have given a considerable amount of thought to armored cars,
gold bars, bank vaults, and stock trades... Is there anything you want to
tell us LOL
Ken
WA2LBI
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 12:44 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote:
> Hi
>
> In the case of a spoof, the target is like
Hi
In the case of a spoof, the target is likely one specific vehicle. You care
about the
armored car with the big pile of gold bars in it. The objective is not to get
him to
drive into a bridge abutment. It’s to get him to turn left on the wrong road.
You tailor
the spoof so everything “make
I think that even with a rudimentary and incomplete knowledge of the road
network one could detect spoofing a car navigation system. The car would
show up inside buildings and farm fields and lakes. You'd see this even
on a very poor map.
If the spoofer moved the signal even 200 yards the matc
Hi all,
On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 06:10:33PM -0400, Ron Bean wrote:
> >In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a
> >roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road.
>
> That's assuming the GPS company keeps their maps up to date (it doesn't
> matte
This article from 2009:
http://web.stanford.edu/group/scpnt/gpslab/website_files/anti-spoofing/insideGNSS_rasd-montgomery.pdf
It talks about spoofing and preventing Spoofing.
On 2017-08-15 09:06, REEVES Paul wrote:
> This was referred to in my post (subject: 'Loran') on 8/8/17 and was a ne
This was referred to in my post (subject: 'Loran') on 8/8/17 and was a news
item in 'Inside GNSS' and other journals before that. Didn't get many comments
on my post :-(
Must have used the wrong subject
Paul G8GJA
-Original Message-
From: time-nuts [mailto:time-nuts-boun...@
>In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a
>roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road.
That's assuming the GPS company keeps their maps up to date (it doesn't
matter how often you update the maps in the device if the company's maps
don't
Detecting a spoof is not really so hard. What you need to redundancy.
When the two navigation methods diverge then you know one of them is acting
up. (that is broken or being spoofed or just buggy)
On a ship you have magnetic compass and knot log and almost certainly gyros
and all these are typi
Hi
Setting up the signals for any time / location on earth is simply matter of
a few mouse clicks with any of a number of packages. No need to do anything
more than that to get the data.
Bob
> On Aug 14, 2017, at 3:02 PM, Graham / KE9H wrote:
>
> Remember the military drone that the Iranian
Remember the military drone that the Iranians tricked into landing in Iran
a few years ago?
The best explanation I heard of how they did it was that they knew that if
it lost its command channel, that it would return to the airport where it
took off.
So, what they did was spoof the GPS with a sig
albertson.ch...@gmail.com said:
> I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm
> reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific
> ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but no
> one uses just GPS alone, they alway com
On 8/14/17 10:24 AM, Magnus Danielson wrote:
Hi Jim,
On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote:
And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that
will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty
easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what
d
Hi,
Sure, some have started to work on it, but far from it. Traditional
navigation helps a lot. While you have signal you can trim continously.
Cheers,
Magnus
On 08/14/2017 07:43 PM, paul swed wrote:
Sextent, compass, and clock.
Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and Coa
Hi
> On Aug 14, 2017, at 2:13 PM, Chris Albertson
> wrote:
>
> The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using
> more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting
> up and turn it off.
In most cases the “other method” is dead reckoning. That’s
Hi
Consider what your automotive GPS receiver does coming out of a tunnel or out
from under
a bunch of trees. It still needs to work correctly in that situation. Same
thing with
a big rain cloud “over there”. I don’t think you would want a receiver that
went nuts in those cases.
I don’t thi
The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using
more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting
up and turn it off.
I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm
reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side
HI
Since multi path is a real issue in a mobile environment, defining what an
“abnormal”
change is could be quite tricky. A reasonable “spoof” would start with feeding
the correct
data and then slowly capture the target (still with correct data). Once he is
are “in charge”
signal wise, start do
Civilian receivers generally do not measure absolute strength but instead
report S/N. The spoofer could fake up a reasonable amount of noise to get a
wimpy S/N with a much stronger signal.
Tim.
On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker
wrote:
> Wouldn't monitoring the received signal stren
In some sense the "jump everyone to the airport 32km away" is a
too-simplistic case because it's too easy to detect.
Let's just arbitrarily place 100nanoseconds as the threshold for detectable
time jump indicating that you're being spoofed. Yes modern timing receivers
do better than that all the t
Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any
non-normal increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible
spoofing? The spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's
received signal strength would be.
Ken S
---
This email has been checked for viruses by
Sextent, compass, and clock.
Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and Coast Guard
have re-introduced that training.
On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Magnus Danielson <
mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org> wrote:
> Hi Jim,
>
> On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote:
>
>> And GPS users who
Hi
> On Aug 14, 2017, at 11:38 AM, Clint Jay wrote:
>
> All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not
> going to be an impossible task.
>
> I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many
> applications for not just state actors.
There ha
Hi Jim,
On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote:
And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that
will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy
to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the
signal from each S/V is coming
All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not
going to be an impossible task.
I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many
applications for not just state actors.
On 14 Aug 2017 4:32 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26
I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the
attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't it?
There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could
monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals
from
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400
Tim Shoppa wrote:
> I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be
> possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved without
> so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut
> could notice sti
Hi
Time is one more thing the spoofer needs to consider. It does not eliminate the
ability to spoof, it just adds one more factor to his setup. If he’s got a
“clear” GPS
signal to base his spoof on, that gives him a timebase to use.
Bob
> On Aug 14, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Tim Shoppa wrote:
>
> B
Hi
The big(er) deal with some systems is that they offer encrypted services. If
you happen to have
access to the crypto version, that’s going to help you. As long as you are
using “public” (and thus
fully documented) modes … not a lot of difference. The same info that lets
anybody design a
re
Bringing this back around to time-nuts - wouldn't the timescale
discontinuity at the receiver, be a powerful clue that spoofing was going
on? But these being navigation receivers they aren't looking so critically
at the time.
Presumably this was a single-transmitter jammer that pretended it was a
On 8/14/17 8:24 AM, Attila Kinali wrote:
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100
Clint Jay wrote:
That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and
would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill
to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrou
So, what I wonder: to what extent (if any) are GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo
sufficiently different that it is challenging to spoof all three in the same
way? Is there any reason why it is more than 3 times the work to spoof all 3?
Is there something clever receivers can do, with awareness of all th
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100
Clint Jay wrote:
> That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and
> would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill
> to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if
> anyone decided to
Hi Björn,
bg wrote:
> Hi Martin,
> No there was also a SDR hack to spoof.
> http://www.rtl-sdr.com/cheating-at-pokemon-go-with-a-hackrf-and-gps-spoofing/
This sounds indeed like a nice way to test if a real spoofing approach
is working properly, so it could also be used to do really evil things.
Oh definitely and if I was going to cheat at Pokémon then that'd be the
most cost effective method (yes, I play, my 9 year old son insists) but I'd
rather have the "fun" of actually catching them the proper way
On 14 Aug 2017 12:08 pm, "Martin Burnicki"
wrote:
> Clint Jay wrote:
> > No, this was
Clint Jay wrote:
> No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice
> Rohde&Schwarz test equipment.
Ah, OK, of course that's also possible.
However, what I found was much simpler:
https://devs-lab.com/how-to-play-pokemon-go-without-moving-no-root-required.html
__
No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice
Rohde&Schwarz test equipment.
On 14 Aug 2017 10:42 am, "Martin Burnicki"
wrote:
> Clint Jay wrote:
> > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
> > using that example was to show how 'simple' and
and frequency measurement
Subject: Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian
cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote:
> Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
> using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology
Clint Jay wrote:
> Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
> using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
> if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
> (obviously you'd need deep pockets).
I just search
Clint Jay wrote:
> Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
> using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
> if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
> (obviously you'd need deep pockets).
>
> That it c
Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
(obviously you'd need deep pockets).
That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it
Clint Jay wrote:
> It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of
> students who used it to fool Pokémon go...
Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just
fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage.
___
It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of
students who used it to fool Pokémon go...
On 14 Aug 2017 8:27 am, "Martin Burnicki"
wrote:
> Clint Jay wrote:
> > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
> > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab g
Clint Jay wrote:
> Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
> shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?
https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea
https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tri
This has been an area of interest to the US Air Force for many years:
http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-10-18/usaf-facility-tests-gps-jamming-vulnerability
--
Bill Byrom N5BB
On Mon, Aug 14, 2017, at 12:46 AM, Clint Jay wrote:
> Didn't someone demonstrate th
Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?
On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen wrote:
> FYI, John K1AE
>
> -Original Message-
> From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-boun...@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT
> DOHER
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