Re: [TLS] Asymmetric TLS

To avoid a lot of "Over my dead body" comments, these requirements should be met with a very visible man in the middle and two (or more) TLS sessions. This architecture should provide some security from unwanted men in the middle, as well as making it obvious to the endpoints who that man in

Re: [TLS] Asymmetric TLS

On 05/04/16 18:29, Sean Turner wrote: > But, what I will say as chair is that this would most definitely > require a charter change for the WG. FYI: you'd also have to climb over an AD-dead-body to get that. S. smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature

Re: [TLS] Asymmetric TLS

With my chair hat on, I won’t comment one way or the other on whether this should be done, but we have gone down this path before. As I recall, the proposal was pretty resoundingly rejected. But, what I will say as chair is that this would most definitely require a charter change for the WG.

Re: [TLS] Asymmetric TLS

On 4 April 2016 at 14:24, Phil Lello wrote: > Would there be interest in extending TLS to: > - allow monitoring-with-consent (based on asymmetric encryption)? > - allow re-signing from an authorised MITM to support caching? This is very bad; no.

Re: [TLS] call for consensus: changes to IANA registry rules for cipher suites

Adam Langley writes: >Ideas for supporting this case (i.e. the "I want to do HTTPS to my router" >problem) in browsers have done the rounds a few times. This isn't for HTTPS to a router, it's to SCADA devices. The preferred interface to them is HTTPS, but since