Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Rob Sayre
The shorter ID was described as such: "significantly limits future flexibility." What "flexibility" is lost? thanks, Rob On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:57 PM Carrick Bartle wrote: > I see. It seems reasonable to me to leave it as a variable-length vector > to provide flexibility. Since the best mi

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Carrick Bartle
I see. It seems reasonable to me to leave it as a variable-length vector to provide flexibility. Since the best mitigation for the privacy issue, regardless of the length of the config_id, is to have a large anonymity set as described in Security and Privacy Goals, it doesn't seem like a longer

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 17/02/2021 00:34, Eric Rescorla wrote: How is it any harder to manage a multi-octet server-chosen value than a single-octet server-chosen value? Easier for the library on the server side. If it's >1 octet then someone will want some semantics. If ==1 then they'll have to accept none and po

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:31 PM Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > On 16/02/2021 21:31, Christopher Wood wrote: > > That's true, but I'd personally prefer one tracking vector to two. > > This structure also better aligns with other proposed use cases for > > HPKE configurations. I also don't se

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:21 PM Carrick Bartle wrote: > It's not significant extra complexity to have this field bigger and it > basically makes it impossible to have any structure. > > > What do you mean by structure? How does a byte not provide sufficient > "structure"? > It's not long enough

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 16/02/2021 21:31, Christopher Wood wrote: That's true, but I'd personally prefer one tracking vector to two. This structure also better aligns with other proposed use cases for HPKE configurations. I also don't see an immediate need for flexibility in this value given that there are ex

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Carrick Bartle
> It's not significant extra complexity to have this field bigger and it > basically makes it impossible to have any structure. What do you mean by structure? How does a byte not provide sufficient "structure"? > On Feb 16, 2021, at 3:33 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > On Tue, Feb 16, 2

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 3:01 PM Martin Thomson wrote: > On Wed, Feb 17, 2021, at 08:31, Christopher Wood wrote: > > That's true, but I'd personally prefer one tracking vector to two. This > > structure also better aligns with other proposed use cases for HPKE > > configurations. I also don't see

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Martin Thomson
On Wed, Feb 17, 2021, at 08:31, Christopher Wood wrote: > That's true, but I'd personally prefer one tracking vector to two. This > structure also better aligns with other proposed use cases for HPKE > configurations. I also don't see an immediate need for flexibility in > this value given that

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Christopher Wood
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021, at 1:02 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > I am not in favor of shrinking this to a single byte, as it > significantly limits future flexibility. > > As far as I can tell, the argument here is to limit the entropy > available for tracking, but recall that in this case the attacker

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Eric Rescorla
I am not in favor of shrinking this to a single byte, as it significantly limits future flexibility. As far as I can tell, the argument here is to limit the entropy available for tracking, but recall that in this case the attacker controls the DNS and they can (for instance) provide a unique IPv6

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Ben Schwartz
I find the language around "optional" configuration identifiers confusing here. Both of these proposals require ECHConfig to specify an identifier, and both of them require the client to transmit one, so it doesn't seem very "optional". I think the point is that special case usage profiles are pe

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-16 Thread Christopher Wood
On the heels of this change, here's another PR that I'd folks to weigh in on: https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/381 Thanks, Chris On Mon, Feb 8, 2021, at 2:29 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: > We previously had a server-selected label for the ECHConfig, but that > has since been

[TLS] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-41

2021-02-16 Thread Dan Romascanu via Datatracker
Reviewer: Dan Romascanu Review result: Ready I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments. For more informati