Re: [TLS] Frequent ephemeral Diffie-Hellman in long-term (D)TLS 1.3 connections replacing IPsec

2021-02-17 Thread Watson Ladd
On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 7:52 AM John Mattsson wrote: > > Hi, > > 3GPP has historically to a large degree used IPsec to protect interfaces in > the core and radio access networks. Recently, 3GPP has more and more been > specifying use of (D)TLS to replace or complement IPsec. Most 3GPP usage of

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 17/02/2021 21:00, Eric Rescorla wrote: On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 8:24 AM Stephen Farrell wrote: On 17/02/2021 16:00, Eric Rescorla wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:44 PM Stephen Farrell < stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: On 17/02/2021 00:34, Eric Rescorla wrote: How is it any har

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 8:24 AM Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 17/02/2021 16:00, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:44 PM Stephen Farrell < > stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> > > wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> On 17/02/2021 00:34, Eric Rescorla wrote: > >>> How is it any harder to manage a

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Carrick Bartle
Not if "more resistence" is still trivial. > On Feb 17, 2021, at 9:51 AM, Jonathan Hoyland > wrote: > > Being totally indistinguishable is probably impossible, but all else being > equal more resistance is better than less, no? > > Regards, > > Jonathan > > On Wed, 17 Feb 2021 at 17:41, Ca

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Jonathan Hoyland
Being totally indistinguishable is probably impossible, but all else being equal more resistance is better than less, no? Regards, Jonathan On Wed, 17 Feb 2021 at 17:41, Carrick Bartle wrote: > Numerous ways a client can "stick out" have been identified, to the point > where it's trivial to bl

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Carrick Bartle
Numerous ways a client can "stick out" have been identified, to the point where it's trivial to block connections using real ECH, regardless of the length of the config_id, which was why I thought we'd largely dropped the attempt not to stick out. > On Feb 17, 2021, at 8:35 AM, Jonathan Hoyla

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Jonathan Hoyland
I know that ECH doesn't provide security against probing attackers, but such an attacker could easily maintain a list of active keys, and drop connections using them. If the key ID is very long, this would be highly effective at allowing grease ECH connections, but blocking real ECH connections. A

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 17/02/2021 16:00, Eric Rescorla wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:44 PM Stephen Farrell wrote: On 17/02/2021 00:34, Eric Rescorla wrote: How is it any harder to manage a multi-octet server-chosen value than a single-octet server-chosen value? Easier for the library on the server side.

Re: [TLS] [ECH] Reverting the config ID change

2021-02-17 Thread Eric Rescorla
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:44 PM Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 17/02/2021 00:34, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > How is it any harder to manage a multi-octet server-chosen value than a > > single-octet server-chosen value? > > Easier for the library on the server side. If it's >1 octet > then someone w