On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 10:18:29AM -0400, denny.obre...@a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote:
> trinity pointard wrote ..
> > For an easy example, let's imagine that we let any relay put itself
> > into any family. Now suppose the attacker starts three relays A1, A2,
> > and A3. Then, since nothing stops
trinity pointard wrote ..
> . It's not as easy as having a unique ID, you need to make sure a
> relay can't spoof being part of a family, that's why it requires a two
> way relationship for now, and will probably use some form of signature
> in the future.
Why not take advantage of the proof
On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 5:21 AM Matt Palmer wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 13, 2023 at 12:55:17PM -0400, denny.obre...@a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net
> wrote:
> > This has probably been addressed before but why isn't the MyFamily value
> > just a single, unique ID?
> >
> > If I have the relays with the fingerprints
> This has probably been addressed before but why isn't the MyFamily value just
> a single, unique ID?
There is a proposal to have some way of doing that in the future, but
that proposal isn't implemented
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/321-happy-families.md
Hey,
the paper is from August 2018 (if I looked at the correct one), not so
recent :)
And e. g. Philipp Winter questions the usefulness of iat_mode:
> substantial performance penalty for a dubious and poorly understood
privacy gain
On Sat, May 13, 2023 at 12:55:17PM -0400, denny.obre...@a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote:
> This has probably been addressed before but why isn't the MyFamily value
> just a single, unique ID?
>
> If I have the relays with the fingerprints "John", "Jane", and "Alice" and
> I want to add "Bob", wouldn't it
This has probably been addressed before but why isn't the MyFamily value just a
single, unique ID?
If I have the relays with the fingerprints "John", "Jane", and "Alice" and I
want to add "Bob", wouldn't it be simpler (and more logical) to add the unique
MyFamily "Smith" to each torrc file
Hello dear relay and bridge hosts,
recently a paper was published, describing a traffic confirmation attack called
DeepCorr, which works against Tor users and as such, also hidden services.
The attack allegedly had success rates of up to 96% percent.
It is being worked on and listed here as a
