boot.
However, most big organization running Tor nodes have either their own
colocated servers like me (except I am not a big contributor) or dedicated
servers giving you more options.
I even have an intrusion (case-opening) sensor on my server which wipes RAM and
kills power once activated.
On Saturday, 5 October 2024 00:40 George Hartley via tor-relays wrote:
> You should default to full disk / partition encryption.
Apart from that FDE is _not_ recommended, especially for Tor exits.
What is the point of a 24/7/365 running cloud or KVM server that the admins
can copy at any t
Try to use mtr to that specific DirAuth, and see where you are being nullrouted.
Then contact that ASN (would be better if your provider did this in your name)
and ask why your origin is excluded / not routed-through.
They don't have to be "bad guys" or "Tor-unfriendly"
oot up with one descriptor / secret_key gets
favored, the other / "fake" I believe I read a while back will not be allowed
on to the network, but take this with a grain of salt.
-GH
On Friday, October 4th, 2024 at 11:51 PM, Osservatorio Nessuno via tor-relays
wrote:
> Hi,
Hi,
thanks both for your input.
On 03/10/2024 21:24, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
But:
FallbackDir can also move to another provider/host. Simply copy the Tor keys
of the instance to the new host. I've done that several times.
While we could, I would think it is not a great sec
Yes, you can do this, you need to back up the following two files:
> secret_id_key
> ed25519_master_id_secret_key
But the problem I think is that while you can move your node, the old IP and
port is still hardcoded into the Tor codebase.
-GH
On Thursday, October 3rd, 2024 at 9:24 PM, bo
On Thursday, 3 October 2024 18:59 Osservatorio Nessuno via tor-relays wrote:
> We are writing this email in advance, since the node is in
> the FallbackDir list and embedded in Tor. The cluster will be powered
> off on 25th November.
FallbackDir have been selected 'automatically&
On Wednesday, 2 October 2024 21:24 Sebastian Hahn wrote:
> > On 2. Oct 2024, at 09:05, George Hartley via tor-relays
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> > It could be that your provider has throttled you temporarily.
> >
> > I don't think so, I get that messag
list and embedded in Tor. The cluster will be powered
off on 25th November.
punki E43244684E0C924EC082B8ECC735FAF2F8CF1C45
Cheers
Giulio
[1] -
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/E43244684E0C924EC082B8ECC735FAF2F8CF1C45
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On Wednesday, 2 October 2024 17:07 Toralf Förster via tor-relays wrote:
> On 10/2/24 13:03, meskio wrote:
> > Not a concrete one. My plan is to review the situation early next month
> > and
> > depending on the usage bring the conversation on what to do with those
> > br
On 10/2/24 17:43, meskio wrote:
I think best right now is to configure them to be distributed over "settings".
As this is what will be automatically used by Tor Browser and other clients.
Thx.
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should show it as online, as you don't need IPv6 to be reachable to get the
online flag.
-GH
On Tuesday, October 1st, 2024 at 7:55 PM, boldsuck via tor-relays
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org wrote:
> On Tuesday, 1 October 2024 19:32 denny.obre...@a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote:
>
>
moat
bridges. What methods are currently preferred?
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On Tuesday, 1 October 2024 19:32 denny.obre...@a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote:
>After my last restart I have:
>
>```
>
>Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
>
> Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc"
odem and kernel command line.
Can you attach your tor log file?
You can also adjust the log verbosity of certain "domains" within Tor like so:
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#Log
Please let us know what you find.
Thanks,
George
On Tuesday, October 1st, 20
find out-of-date /
potentially vulnerable nodes and e-mail the associated e-mail address.
On average 10% actually respond, but most don't care or simply forgot about
their exclusively for Tor-purposes made e-mail address.
I usually wait 48 hours, and if they didn't respond by then, I try again
On 9/19/24 18:46, meskio wrote:
We plan to watch the usage of moat bridges and evaluate moving them
to another distributor depending on the usage[3].
Is there any timeline for the movement?
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Hello,
I don't see how this is an issue, because Tor guards / middles only ever relay
traffic, and exits already have sufficient REJECT rules:
> reject 0.0.0.0/8:*
> reject 169.254.0.0/16:*
> reject 127.0.0.0/8:*
> reject 192.168.0.0/16:*
> reject 10.0.0.0/8:*
> reject
There are some very significant recent CVEs out for CUPS, the unix
printing system.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=cups
It's an ideal moment to remind relay operators that a Tor node, relay or
bridge, should be a single-purpose internet server.
Running alternate int
On Thursday, 26 September 2024 08:01 Tor Relay Net Ops via tor-relays wrote:
> I think it might have not recognized the address has changed, because it
> doesn't recover after a while (I waited around 3~ days)
> There are no firewall rules that would intervene with this process, on
it recover
if you wait a while?
I think it might have not recognized the address has changed, because it
doesn't recover after a while (I waited around 3~ days)
There are no firewall rules that would intervene with this process, on
the MikroTik side it's just an DST-NAT rule to my to
scripts for Mikrotik.
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>From my experience, it should come back online, but not instantly - you likely
>need to wait for the next descriptor to be uploaded (once every 6 hours
>usually).
All the best,
George
On Wednesday, September 25th, 2024 at 12:53 PM, Tor Relay Net Ops via
tor-relays wrote:
> Gree
Greetings fellow relay operators!
I'm currently running a tor relay on a dynamic IP Address connection,
usually my ISP gives me a new address every day or so-
Lately [for the past like week or so- /can't remember when it started
happening/], I have to manually restart it when
tly-deployed pluggable transports, showing that meek
> and obfs4-iat0 provide little protection against DeepCorr’s flow
> correlation, while obfs4-iat1 provides a better protection against
> DeepCorr (note that none of these obfuscation mechanisms are
> currently deployed by public Tor relays,
Hi,
On 24/09/2024 14:32, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
Some uplink providers offer BGP+IPv6+IPv4 in a bundle. (he.net)
sadly we do not have this option at the moment.
Since you can operate 32-40 nodes with 4-5 IPs, this would be an option
to start with. With fast CPUs (clock speed), you
On 9/24/24 20:56, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
Oh, you're right. It's nicer because I have instance name in front of it.
Then "grep -h" is your friend
;)
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Toralf Förster via tor-relays wrote:
> On 9/24/24 15:40, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
> > https://paste.systemli.org/?d3987a7dc4df49fa#7GF2qk8hyTVgkinZshff9Dc9R6ukD
> > DZo6BQqwQURzjQy
> OT, but useless use of cat ;)
Oh, you're right. It's nicer because I have
On 9/24/24 18:39, David Fifield wrote:
The numbers are rounded to reduce precision.
https://spec.torproject.org/dir-spec/extra-info-document-format.html
ah, thx.
I'm just curious, if 4 is rounded to 0 or to 8 ?
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pasture_clubbed242--- via tor-relays wrote:
> I could only find this article saying there is a 'cert=' option, which
> initially appear useful for Tor.
Cert is default in obfs4 bridelines, you can create yours with:
~# cat /var/lib/tor-instances/01/fingerprint
nikname fingerp
,mu=8,nl=8,tr=8,us=8
i26 bridge-ips de=8
luchs bridge-ips de=8
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On 9/24/24 15:40, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
https://paste.systemli.org/?d3987a7dc4df49fa#7GF2qk8hyTVgkinZshff9Dc9R6ukDDZo6BQqwQURzjQy
OT, but useless use of cat ;)
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On Montag, 23. September 2024 22:27:25 CEST Fran via tor-relays wrote:
> Philipp Winter regarding iat mode:
> >The feature introduces a substantial performance penalty for a dubious
> >and poorly understood privacy gain. If I were to write an algorithm to
> >detect obf
Osservatorio Nessuno via tor-relays wrote:
> our organization is working to add more physical nodes, in our little
> Italy headquarter[1]. We have reached an agreement with one of the
> available fiber reseller there, where we will pay for L2 transport to a
> datacenter, where we
Out of curiosity, can any other options be passed with ServerTransportOptions
besides iat-mode?
I could only find this article saying there is a 'cert=' option, which
initially appear useful for Tor.
https://hamy.io/post/000d/how-to-hide-obfuscate-any-traffic-using-obfs4/
Thank you
tify the protocol. In hindsight, it was >probably
>a mistake to expose the iat option to users and bridge operators.
>
>Cheers,
>Philipp
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-February/019370.html
On 23/09/2024 12:15, George Hartley via tor-relays wrote:
Hello Tor co
recipients of any abuse.
We have now two options: either look for someone willing to lease a /24
to Tor operators, which is not an easy task since the block reputation
will be tainted and depreciate the block. We have found someone willing
to, for $119/mo, but it is hard to tell how long that
Hello Tor community,
this e-mail applies to you if you are running an obfs4 (now known under the
name lyrebird) bridge or want to do so in the future.
Some recent posts on this list has shown that traffic timing analysis can be
used to locate a users or onion services guard nodes or bridges
as guard?
This is just my guess though.
Alles Gute (since you are German),
George
On Wednesday, September 18th, 2024 at 6:35 PM, Richie wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
> nothing of real concern, but out of curiosity: since some years now i
> use overhead traffic on my ISP for Tor, wit
sc
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On Mittwoch, 18. September 2024 09:10:31 CEST Florian Kohrt via tor-relays
wrote:
A few facts from these German films and notes:
- "Boystown" was one of the largest pedophile darknet forums of all time.
400.000 User
- The administrator's chats played a crucial role in tracking
isabela fernandes wrote on 2024-09-16:
I am reaching out to inform you of an upcoming news story concerning a
potential deanonymization attack on Onion Services.
These are the articles, in German language:
Ermittlungen im Darknet: Strafverfolger hebeln Tor-Anonymisierung aus
<ht
Hi all,
Today, NDR issued a press release with more details on the subject:
https://www.ndr.de/der_ndr/presse/mitteilungen/Ermittlungen-im-sogenannten-Darknet-Strafverfolger-hebeln-Tor-Anonymisierung-aus,pressemeldungndr24724.html
It mentions that the (German) Federal Criminal Police Office
Greetings Marco,
Something I always found confusing is what the difference is between the
Vanguards Github project, and the version of Vanguards that Tor has
implemented. I thought Vanguards was added into Tor no? Is the Vanguards
project still useful despite this?
I'm not sure if this
On Montag, 16. September 2024 22:03:02 CEST Toralf Förster via tor-relays wrote:
> On 9/16/24 21:13, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
> > Some court documents are linked here, in the google sheets:
> > https://safereddit.com/r/TOR/comments/19benkx/operation_liberty_lane_le_ru
>
On 9/16/24 21:13, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
Some court documents are linked here, in the google sheets:
https://safereddit.com/r/TOR/comments/19benkx/operation_liberty_lane_le_running_gaurd_and/?rdt=40060
Gus may have gotten some more documents.
returns: "Failed to parse page JSON
On Montag, 16. September 2024 12:31:24 CEST isabela fernandes wrote:
> On September 9, 2024, The Tor Project received a press inquiry from
> Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR, part of ARD, a German public broadcaster) with
> The reporter claims to have "evidence that shows that in
.
I am running Tor 4.8.12 installed from the official Tor repositories in Ubuntu
22.04 with OR port 9001. The entire network is an EdgeRouter plugged into WAN
and then a firewall rule letting traffic hit the host for Tor. The relay is
indeed working, but everyday it seems that less and less
home using your own routers and IPv4 addresses,
possibly by using a business cable / fiber plan?
If not, then I do not see the need to raid the homes of exit operators, as even
in Germany, most police agents are aware of Tor and some of the abuse (Child
porn, and so on) that it is used for, however
Hi Gero.
Im sorry for this! Staatsanwaltschaft is really not able to use google or wants to learn basic understanding of TOR and its infrastructure.
I unfortunately made the same experience about 2 years ago! 6am, knock knock, police.
There is a Strafentschädigungsgesetz which allows
Am Sat, 7 Sep 2024 15:14:56 -0300
schrieb gus :
> > > https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-relayop-sept7th-meetup-keep Room
>
> Gus
Hi Gus
During reading through the pad I think I unfortunately deleted the link
under "4. New Relay Governance docs" when I clicked the link on
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Debian GNU/Linux
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On Donnerstag, 5. September 2024 19:53:00 CEST gus wrote:
> Just a friendly reminder that we're meeting this Saturday,
> September 7th @ 1900 UTC.
>
> Meeting pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-relayop-sept7th-meetup-keep
> Room link: https://tor.meet.coop/gus-og0-x74-dzn
&g
On Freitag, 6. September 2024 08:47:14 CEST eff_03675...@posteo.se wrote:
OK,
looks like TorProject (Gus) renamed the key and resolved
tor-archive-keyring.gpg vs. deb.torproject.org-keyring.gpg mismatch.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/support/-/issues/368
Then I can update my sources
On Montag, 2. September 2024 19:01:16 CEST code9n via tor-relays wrote:
> I know I should have sorted this some weeks ago but can anyone tell me a
> simple method of dealing with the:
As root, one line:
wget -qO-
https://deb.torproject.org/torproje
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On Montag, 2. September 2024 14:54:55 CEST gus wrote:
Hello Alex,
First of all, it's nice that you're on the list.
Maybe you would like to listen in on the meeting on Saturday.
(It's anonymous and without a webcam)
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2024-August/02
Hello everyone,
I’ve been a fan of Tor for many years now, and my affinity for anonymity
naturally extends to other interests, such as Monero… 😉
I’ve successfully rallied like-minded individuals who have generously supported
our cause through various grants, and we’ve even received a
On Freitag, 30. August 2024 14:35:26 CEST Alessandro Greco via tor-relays
wrote:
> I noticed that you have a lot of Bridges active and in this regard I wanted
I have different subnets on the servers and each bridge has a different IP+IPv6.
Until 3 years ago you could get 1 IP for less tha
Hi Landon,
>but keeping it up to date is not easy.
>Plus, I don't really know how to keep it up to date like that.
You check for a tor update every month or three, download the latest
archive, compile and install that and as soon as you restart tor, it'll
be up to date.
It bein
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On Mittwoch, 28. August 2024 07:53:21 CEST Alessandro Greco via tor-relays
wrote:
> > Once your bridge has been running stable for a few weeks, an advanced but
> > experimental feature is to hide OrPort.
>
> So is it possible to remove the ports from the torrc file while keepin
> Once your bridge has been running stable for a few weeks, an advanced but
> experimental feature is to hide OrPort.
So is it possible to remove the ports from the torrc file while keeping them
unchanged? But what if for some reasons (For istance necessary updates) you
have to restart to
ine too. Also be sure to learn
> about 'BandwidthBurst' in case its behavior is surprising to you.
>
If a bridge reaches 20-30 MBytes, that's already a lot. There are only very
few (guard|exit) relays on Tor-Metrics that reach 100 MBytes.
> Should an anti DDoS system be configu
On Montag, 26. August 2024 17:33:22 CEST Marco Predicatori wrote:
> All this is pretty scary. Pretty much any exit node manager can be arrested
> on the very same basis.
No.
A Tor router does not host any data, it is a router like any other ISP or
backbone router.
I am currently updati
q
I've been using it for a few months.
Decentralized, no ID, protected metadata, multiple user profiles, some designs
taken from the Tor protocol. All SimpleX servers optionally accessible via Tor
and you can run your own private SimpleX server.
Jack Dorsey invested a large sum in further
Dear all,
In the past, I set up a middle relay node, and today I am looking to experiment
with configuring a Bridge node to support the Tor project and its community.
Since this is a very sensitive task, I decided to reach out to you to ensure
that the setup is correct and that the
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Hey,
this should help you out:
https://blog.torproject.org/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay/
Sincerely,
George
On Monday, August 19th, 2024 at 8:01 PM, observatory123 via tor-relays
wrote:
> Dear fellow relay operators,
>
> I've been hosting a tor relay on a VPS (strato) for a c
On Donnerstag, 8. August 2024 22:20:35 CEST eff_03675...@posteo.se wrote:
> Hi Rafo,
>
> My apologies for the late reply in your request for the code on banning
> tor exits into *GUARDS or middle-relays*
Before many people copy this, a note:
A relay with exit flag is MOSTLY used for
F to strict
adkim=s; aspf=s;
and DMARC subdomain policy to reject
sp=reject;
Since then, emails about Tor-exits have dropped to 0
;-)
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On Sonntag, 14. Juli 2024 15:54:45 CEST Toralf Förster via tor-relays wrote:
> On 7/12/24 00:14, boldsuck wrote:
> > The idea is not bad. But can you simply discard every ≤ 50byte packet?
>
> Probably not
>
> > I drop fragments and uncommon TCP MSS values.
> > ip
On Dienstag, 20. August 2024 12:12:22 CEST Tzanca via tor-relays wrote:
> > I bet the reason that my server periodically goes offline is because it is
> > being blocked and not because it is actually offline!
>
> It can be the metrics server seeing server down but server actuall
Hello,
Yes it's very normal. After 2 weeks you will see the speed increasing. You can
read here about the lifecycle of a new relay
https://blog.torproject.org/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay/
Kind regards,
Tzanca
On Monday, August 19th, 2024 at 9:01 PM, observatory123 via tor-relays
wrote:
&
don wrote:
> TL;DR...
> Write down your Tor server's GATEWAY IP address. if your server goes offline,
> try tracerouting to your Tor server's gateway IP address as well as your Tor
> server's IP address! You might be surprised by what you see!
>
> And also install M
with their own headaches/challenges vs.
guard relays.
This is normal as well. I don't know speedtest-cli specifically, but I imagine
it's a regular tcp/udp speedtest while Tor traffic is more likely to be CPU
limited instead of network throughput limited. Just pushing some udp/tcp
traffic
Dear fellow relay operators,
I've been hosting a tor relay on a VPS (strato) for a couple days now. I've
never done this before, so I have a couple of questions:
- Is it normal for my relay to only use up only about 2 MB/s after nearly 5
days of uptime despite bandwidth speed tests
Hi Landon,
Aarch64 is a supported architecture for tor, although it appears there
isn't a buildbot for binaries.
It'll be easiest to just compile from source, which I'll help you with.
First you install dependencies and fine GNU software
(I'm guessing some of the depende
Even though Cogent has ethical issues, this is unlikely what happened.
Most likely, either an outage occurred or a voluntary filtering had been
put in place on your Virtual Machine by the ISP at which it is hosted.
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I just typed up a huge reply and it did not get saved for some reason.
Okay, let's do it this way then:
1.) I don't think we need to re-invent the wheel, (q)Tox can be used over Tor,
that is likely one of the messengers you mentioned.
2.) I am currently not receiving the medicatio
I just typed up a huge reply and it did not get saved for some reason.
Okay, let's do it this way then:
1.) I don't think we need to re-invent the wheel, (q)Tox can be used over Tor,
that is likely one of the messengers you mentioned.
2.) I am currently not receiving the medicatio
ds to put on the line for it to drop or get null-routed
automatically.
On Wednesday, August 14th, 2024 at 3:47 PM, George Hartley via tor-relays
wrote:
> If there is DoS on bridges on domestic connections, or connections with very
> low throughput, then handling (D)DoS at an application la
o use needrestart to detect services and/or kernel
requiring a reboot and do it [2].
So it works all out of the box w/o manual intervention here.
[1]
https://github.com/toralf/tor-relays/blob/main/playbooks/roles/setup_common/tasks/auto-update.yaml
[2]
https://github.com/toralf/tor-relays/blob/main/play
On 8/14/24 16:13, boldsuck wrote:
If you have 'unattended upgrades' enabled, you will get an ERROR email.
Highly depends on a configured mailer IMO.
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so hosted a hidden IRC server, as well as a Tor hidden service on my
grandmothers laptop, to be able to SSH in through Tor and troubleshoot problems.
Experienced no packet loss, unless a relay in the circuit suddenly went offline.
If you want, I can measure packet loss from various locations
:20 PM, pasture_clubbed242--- via tor-relays
wrote:
> Since it is still all fresh in our heads, I wanted to pitch an idea real
> fast. No idea if it was covered at a tor meeting at some point.
>
> For bridge relay operators, such as those with very low bandwidth, it may be
> w
Since it is still all fresh in our heads, I wanted to pitch an idea real fast.
No idea if it was covered at a tor meeting at some point.
For bridge relay operators, such as those with very low bandwidth, it may be
worth it to keep lower-than-consensus-restrictions using the DOS flags here
PM, George Hartley
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I think this started with release 0.4.8.10, but both of my Tor relays no
> longer reload their config when doing for example:
>
>
> - systemctl reload tor@exit
>
>
> Here is the relevant part of the unit file:
licy allows.
> DoSCircuitCreation/DoSConnection are enacted by guards, to protect
> themselves, and to some extent the rest of the network, from "noisy
> IPs" trying to connect to Tor.
> ReevaluateExitPolicy is not a DoS option, it doesn't take any action
> automatically. It is
P.S:
If this is a client to guard detection only, then why does my exit node also
block a significant amount of DoS (I had around the same statistics when my
guard probability fraction was still zero, so clearly something is working):
> Aug 09 21:08:36 matrix tor[XXX]: Aug 09 21:08:36.
Then these must be targeted attacks, as I have never encountered something like
this during 10 years of relay operation under different providers and aliases.
Sorry, but the Tor logs that I am seeing suggest that most DoS gets mitigated.
As far as I know, the concurrent connection (not circuit
This is already impossible, as both circuit and concurrent connection DoS both
gets detected and the IP in question flagged and blacklisted.
Please see the manual on this:
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#DoSCircuitCreationEnabled
All the best,
George
On Sunday, August
> I also don't like the idea of using exit servers as entrances to Tor.
But you do realize that Tor exits also receive the Guard flag, and Guard
probability assigned?
Check my server:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/0F8538398C61ECBE83F595E3716F7CE7E4C77B21
It mostly ac
I would definitely want to be able to change my exit policy by just sending a
simple "kill -SIGHUP $pid".
So yeah, consider myself interested in this functionality.
But, don't we already have that implemented?
I remember changing my exit policy then doing "systemctl relo
On 8/2/24 17:38, Hiro wrote:
We are now opening NSA for testing
May I ask, what the abbreviation "NSA" means?
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Toralf
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>> Since you are all tinkering with your servers anyway, why don't you try
>> deb822-style ;-)
>
> Because that doesn't make sense for public Tor nodes, but rather for .onion
> services.
> Many ISPs and providers have a Debian and Tor mirror and I use them via
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I have had two ubuntu based tor middle relays fail.I am using a proxmox
server and have tried both ubuntu server 20.04 and a fresh download of
ubuntu 24.04. I follow the tor website install instructions. The results
show the same no matter what version of ubuntu. "failed to start
Hi,
>> wget
>> -qO-https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc
>> | gpg --dearmor | tee /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg
>> >/dev/null
>
> Is the name important?
I assume it's Debian? The onfigurat
On 7/16/24 14:03, boldsuck wrote:
wget
-qO-https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc
| gpg --dearmor | tee /usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg >/dev/null
Is the name important?
I'm asking b/c Ansible [1] seems to use "deb.t
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