Original Message
From: Maxim Kammerer m...@dee.su
1. Stop spreading FUD and false claims,
You are projecting.
(c) proposing to invoke an attorney on some kid who tries to work on
an open-source project he likes.
There is nothing wrong with using the legal process to
Thus spake Maxim Kammerer (m...@dee.su):
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org wrote:
The Raccoon has made a believer out of me, but there are some limits to
both of his/her proofs.. The full proofs can still be found here:
Thus spake Ted Smith (te...@riseup.net):
On Mon, 2012-08-20 at 10:33 +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
Hello gentlemen,
snip
[1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx
I ran this script on the current consensus. The full results (the
nodes-sniff-summary file) are below my signature. How did you
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org wrote:
The Raccoon has made a believer out of me, but there are some limits to
both of his/her proofs.. The full proofs can still be found here:
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 8:51 AM, Andreas Krey a.k...@gmx.de wrote:
Buying software for a) will probably show up in public records, and b)
may be hindered by the paranoia of the participating LEAs. Even the software
needed to get all the intercepted data in one place could be nightmarish.
I
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Manually, using WHOIS and traceroute. This can be done
automatically using GeoIP, but I wanted to be sure in the results
(also visited some hosting sites), and writing a proper program
would deviate too much from the initially intended “quick
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tor-relay-stats.py, renamed to compass.py might be useful too:
https://compass.torproject.org/result?by_as=Truetop=10
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- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com -
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 12:49:02 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Reply-To:
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 6:21 PM, The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote:
As I understand it, Tor nodes know IP addresses one up and one down in
a circuit. I haven't read through the Tor codebase in a while (two or
three years), so my question is this: Does Tor apply the same family
avoidance
Or they could get a blanket wiretapping order and catch them all at
once. I've often wondered if it's worth running Tor routers on the
EC2 for this reason.
Bridges make sense if EC2 has enough IP addresses and the censurer doesn't
ban the whole range.
Too many relays give too much power to
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 8:27 PM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
10 11.50%
So, in other words, you'd hav to have 10 Tor routers on the same
network. That's like me having 10 Tor nodes on my home network and
not setting the NodeFamily directive in torrc. Somebody playing games
aside, I
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On 08/21/2012 01:30 PM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
From
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/path-spec.txt:
We do not choose more than one router in a given /16 subnet (unless
EnforceDistinctSubnets is 0).
So, seeing as how
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On 08/21/2012 02:57 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
No, it means that if you intercept traffic from 10 top-bandwidth
Tor routers with some characteristics (Guard + Exit, basically) at
what's probably the nearest hardware switch (seems true for the
Original Message
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
addition
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I think karsten's graphs from #6443 fit also well to this thread:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443
You might also be interested in this thread on tor-relays:
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On 08/21/2012 04:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open wrote:
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor
was mainly used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or
illegal pornography, in addition to claiming such would be not
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 11:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open
w...@safe-mail.net wrote:
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
addition to claiming such would be not difficult to prove.
On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 10:33:29AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
As you can see, sniffing just 25 Class-C networks (or 42 individual
nodes) lets an adversary correlate ~25% of (non-.onion) circuits.
I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
to the calculation),
With Weather Eye Open:
Original Message
From: Bryce Lynch virtualad...@gmail.com
This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or
On Mon, 2012-08-20 at 10:33 +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
Hello gentlemen,
snip
[1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx
I ran this script on the current consensus. The full results (the
nodes-sniff-summary file) are below my signature. How did you compile
the country-codes to IPs list? That wasn't
Maxim Kammerer:
It's comforting that this approach yields quickly diminishing returns.
Going from 25 to 60 networks only gets you a 10% increase in networks
surveillance (if I'm reading the output correctly), and returns plateau
entirely at that point (I'm considering about two percent to be
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 2:11 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
to the calculation), but your point is still generally correct.
There are some subtleties, mainly the restriction on distinct families
in a circuit —
Hello gentlemen,
Here and there I see references to “global” or “state-level” powerful
adversaries when it comes to end-to-end traffic correlation — i.e.,
it's supposed to be very hard. Because Tor network has many nodes,
there are guard nodes, there is research, blog posts, CIA funding
(well,
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