I see you like "modest" better ;-)
-Original Message-
From: Ken Wallis
> colin alfke
> Here is a snip of a post the venerable Ken Wallis made a while back
> explaining how a program is found.
I'm not convinced that I like being referred to as 'venerable' ;^)
Cheers,
Ken
---
u2-use
we wrote a small subroutine which executes the sql by executing !psql ...
it works great from unidata 6.0. i can send you the routine if you want.
matt
On 12/14/05, Jeff Powell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Is there a way to execute queries to a postgresql database from within a
> unibasic progr
David A. Green wrote:
> I'm not sure there is a security risk if your system is setup
> correctly.
>
> Your "object code" needs to be secured so that root only can update.
>
> When you run a program isn't it the sbcs (Shared Basic Code
> Server) that updates the run counter? And sbcs would ha
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Here is a snip of a post the venerable Ken Wallis made a while back
> explaining how a program is found.
I'm not convinced that I like being referred to as 'venerable' ;^)
Cheers,
Ken
---
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Hi Martin
You can lock down Universe so that a UniObjects developer cannot modify or
delete files. Through creating SQL tables, you can set Modify, Update,
Delete levels as you would have in an SQL environment. The issue is not
that UniVerse cannot be secured, it is an issue for how far a user w
I'm not sure there is a security risk if your system is setup correctly.
Your "object code" needs to be secured so that root only can update.
When you run a program isn't it the sbcs (Shared Basic Code Server) that
updates the run counter? And sbcs would have permissions.
Can someone on the lis
Heheh -- who is the largest IBM customer on this list? Maybe they should
take this issue to the mat for everyone else here!! There's strength in
numbers!
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Glenn Herbert
Sent: Friday, December 16, 2005 1:15
Nope. I certainly agree it should be fixed. Historically, it was
never high on the "to-fix" list, but in today's world, it certainly
would be advantageous.
__
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROT
> I think you have the answer. Someone would have to gain access into
> your system, and having done so, what would be the point of
> "sabotaging" something within universe to do something malicious? They
> already have access to your system. If it's someone internal, then I
> would imagine your h
I think that this goes back to the issue I tried to raise a couple of months
back but failed to get much interest.
Imagine that I have an employee who has a valid user name and password to
use my uniObjects based application. He is a knowledgeable sort of chap who
goes home and uses uniObjects to
I think you have the answer. Someone would have to gain access into
your system, and having done so, what would be the point of
"sabotaging" something within universe to do something malicious? They
already have access to your system. If it's someone internal, then I
> David Wolverton
> As a 'security risk', has IBM explicitly been asked to fix
> this item and said they'd prefer just to leave a gaping hole?
> Or is it like many things, everyone knows it, but everyone
> thinks someone else has followed up on it, and it must just
> be 'the way it must be'...
David,
Better&Better <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> will be actively back in
business starting the second week in January. You could bring this to
IBM through them as well.
- Chuck "Security Risk" Barouch
David Wolverton wrote:
As a 'security risk', has IBM explicitly been asked to fix this ite
As a 'security risk', has IBM explicitly been asked to fix this item and
said they'd prefer just to leave a gaping hole? Or is it like many things,
everyone knows it, but everyone thinks someone else has followed up on it,
and it must just be 'the way it must be'... Remember, IBM does not monitor
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