Am 07.01.2015 um 16:27 schrieb RW:
On Wed, 07 Jan 2015 15:01:56 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 07.01.2015 um 14:47 schrieb Matus UHLAR - fantomas:
what if there would be SPF_HELO_FAIL?
SA would not be called at all
Maybe you could disable checking SPF_HELO, but some of us don't
want that.
On Wed, 07 Jan 2015 15:01:56 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
>
> Am 07.01.2015 um 14:47 schrieb Matus UHLAR - fantomas:
> > what if there would be SPF_HELO_FAIL?
>
> SA would not be called at all
>
> > Maybe you could disable checking SPF_HELO, but some of us don't
> > want that.
>
> the question i
Am 07.01.2015 um 14:47 schrieb Matus UHLAR - fantomas:
what if there would be SPF_HELO_FAIL?
SA would not be called at all
Maybe you could disable checking SPF_HELO, but some of us don't want that.
the question is who are "some" and who are the majority
you can even socre "SPF_HELO_SOFTFAI
Am 06.01.2015 um 21:31 schrieb Marieke Janssen:
policyd-spf[11818]: None; identity=mailfrom; client-ip=213.145.228.32;
helo=host5.ssl-gesichert.at;
envelope-from=kundeninfo-return-1-***@domaintechnik.at; receiver=***
$ dig txt +short host5.ssl-gesichert.at
"v=spf1 mx a ~all"
Seems it works as
Am 06.01.2015 um 21:31 schrieb Marieke Janssen:
policyd-spf[11818]: None; identity=mailfrom; client-ip=213.145.228.32;
helo=host5.ssl-gesichert.at;
envelope-from=kundeninfo-return-1-***@domaintechnik.at; receiver=***
$ dig txt +short host5.ssl-gesichert.at
"v=spf1 mx a ~all"
Seems it works as
> policyd-spf[11818]: None; identity=mailfrom; client-ip=213.145.228.32;
helo=host5.ssl-gesichert.at;
envelope-from=kundeninfo-return-1-***@domaintechnik.at; receiver=***
$ dig txt +short host5.ssl-gesichert.at
"v=spf1 mx a ~all"
Seems it works as it should?
/MJ
Am 06.01.2015 um 21:01 schrieb Matus UHLAR - fantomas:
On 06.01.15 03:34, Reindl Harald wrote:
but you are far away from a SPF_HELO_PASS in context of the incoming
mail, frankly it's wrong and unrelated until the envelope sender is
not @helo-hostname
please, post the problem mail header, than
On 06.01.15 03:34, Reindl Harald wrote:
but you are far away from a SPF_HELO_PASS in context of the incoming
mail, frankly it's wrong and unrelated until the envelope sender is
not @helo-hostname
please, post the problem mail header, thank you.
--
Matus UHLAR - fantomas, uh...@fantomas.sk ; h
On Tue, 06 Jan 2015 01:55:18 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
>
> > The point of helo tests is when they fail. If a
> > compromised host is telling you it's not permitted to send email
> > then what does it matter if the (probably spoofed) envelope domain
> > doesn't have an SPF policy
>
> it's a mat
On 2015-01-05 18:34, Reindl Harald wrote:
if the envelope-domain has no SPF published and want to verify
anything in context of HELO then you can check:
* does the HELO hostname exist at all
* does the IP match in both directions
but you are far away from a SPF_HELO_PASS in context of the in
Am 06.01.2015 um 03:25 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 02:45:
i only say there can not be any sort of SPF PASS if the sending domain
don't have any SPF record at all - it's just wrong
you dont get it :(
sending domain is not in helo !
giving up :(
you don't ge
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 02:45:
i only say there can not be any sort of SPF PASS if the sending domain
don't have any SPF record at all - it's just wrong
you dont get it :(
sending domain is not in helo !
giving up :(
Am 06.01.2015 um 03:00 schrieb John Hardin:
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 06.01.2015 um 02:27 schrieb John Hardin:
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
> it's a matter of technical correctness
> no SPF on the envelope domain, no SPF
> > * OK:SPF_PASS
> * OK:SP
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 06.01.2015 um 02:27 schrieb John Hardin:
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
> it's a matter of technical correctness
> no SPF on the envelope domain, no SPF
>
> * OK:SPF_PASS
> * OK:SPF_PASS,SPF_HELO_PASS
> * OK:SPF_NONE
>
Am 06.01.2015 um 02:38 schrieb Derek Diget:
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015 at 00:46 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote:
=>Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:
=>> On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
=>> Reindl Harald wrote:
=>> > Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
=>> > > Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05
Am 06.01.2015 um 02:27 schrieb John Hardin:
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
it's a matter of technical correctness
no SPF on the envelope domain, no SPF
* OK:SPF_PASS
* OK:SPF_PASS,SPF_HELO_PASS
* OK:SPF_NONE
* WRONG: SPF_NONE,SPF_HELO_PASS
one can argue about the severi
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 01:55:
* OK:SPF_PASS
* OK:SPF_PASS,SPF_HELO_PASS
meta SPF_FULL_PASS (SPF_PASS && SPF_HELO_PASS)
score as you like
* OK:SPF_NONE
* WRONG: SPF_NONE,SPF_HELO_PASS
meta SPF_FULL_FAIL (!SPF_PASS && SPF_HELO_PASS)
score as you like
one can argue
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015 at 00:46 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote:
=>Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:
=>> On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
=>> Reindl Harald wrote:
=>> > Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
=>> > > Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
=>> > > > how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_N
On Tue, 6 Jan 2015, Reindl Harald wrote:
it's a matter of technical correctness
no SPF on the envelope domain, no SPF
* OK:SPF_PASS
* OK:SPF_PASS,SPF_HELO_PASS
* OK:SPF_NONE
* WRONG: SPF_NONE,SPF_HELO_PASS
one can argue about the severity but the correctness is out of question
Ar
Am 06.01.2015 um 01:32 schrieb RW:
On Tue, 06 Jan 2015 00:46:18 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:
On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
how can "SPF_HELO_PA
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 01:31:
my whole point is when the sending domain don't have a SPF record and
so "SPF_NONE" correctly hits all meta-rules in context of SPF should
not fire up at all
its irrelevant since helo testing and envelope from is diffrence tests
there is no dependice
On Tue, 06 Jan 2015 00:46:18 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
>
>
> Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:
> > On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
> > Reindl Harald wrote:
> >> Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
> >>> Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
> how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_N
Am 06.01.2015 um 01:27 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 00:41:
Benny i got more then you imagine after maintain some hundret domains
for over a decade from registry level over DNS to email and
webservices, please get out of my sight
fair, helo is more important in s
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-06 00:41:
Benny i got more then you imagine after maintain some hundret domains
for over a decade from registry level over DNS to email and
webservices, please get out of my sight
fair, helo is more important in spf mta checkers then in sa spf checkers
but the
Am 06.01.2015 um 00:06 schrieb RW:
On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
the above is 2 diff tests
i know that by myself *but* if the sen
Am 06.01.2015 um 00:10 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 23:13:
Am 05.01.2015 um 23:07 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
@domaintechnik.at don't publish SPF regardless over what server it was
sent and so i see no valid reason for a positive score of outgoing
mails over host5.s
On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 23:13:15 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
> so what - the domain and the subdomain publish SPF
> as example "whoe...@domaintechnik.at" don't and hence there is no
> justification for hit "score SPF_HELO_PASS -0.001"
>
Ah, when I previously pointed out that it didn't have a positi
om your logfiles or from the headers of the mail
in question?
/MJ
-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Reindl Harald [mailto:h.rei...@thelounge.net]
Verzonden: maandag 5 januari 2015 23:13
Aan: users@spamassassin.apache.org
Onderwerp: Re: SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 23:13:
Am 05.01.2015 um 23:07 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
@domaintechnik.at don't publish SPF regardless over what server it was
sent and so i see no valid reason for a positive score of outgoing
mails over host5.ssl-gesichert.at[213.145.228.32]
helo is mta, do
On Mon, 05 Jan 2015 22:58:55 +0100
Reindl Harald wrote:
>
> Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
> > Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
> >> how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
> >
> > the above is 2 diff tests
>
> i know that by myself *but* if the sending domain does n
Am 05.01.2015 um 23:07 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 22:58:
well, the sender don't publish SPF at all
helo is not a spf policy, its a spf helo policy, confused ?, me 2 :=)
without a SPF record a domain don't have anything but SPF_NONE
dig duggi.junc.org txt
d
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 22:58:
well, the sender don't publish SPF at all
helo is not a spf policy, its a spf helo policy, confused ?, me 2 :=)
dig duggi.junc.org txt
dig junc.org txt
see not one spf txt, but 2
hope that covers it for others aswell
Am 05.01.2015 um 22:54 schrieb Benny Pedersen:
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
the above is 2 diff tests
i know that by myself *but* if the sending domain does not publish any
SPF policy then there should be no positive score for "SPF_H
Reindl Harald skrev den 2015-01-05 18:52:
how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
the above is 2 diff tests
Am 05.01.2015 um 19:22 schrieb Derek Diget:
On Jan 5, 2015 at 18:52 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote:
=>how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
Just by going off the names...
The domain presented in the HELO (RFC5321.HELO) command
passed the SPF check_host() test while the domain used in the mai
On Jan 5, 2015 at 18:52 +0100, Reindl Harald wrote:
=>how can "SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_NONE" fire both?
Just by going off the names...
The domain presented in the HELO (RFC5321.HELO) command
passed the SPF check_host() test while the domain used in the mail from
(RFC5321.MailFrom) command didn't hav
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