Thanks, Rick.
I can add more about the dynamic nature of some root stores to Section 2.1.
In 2.2, I wasn't sure what to say because I didn't think I should speak for
Mozilla, even though it's been explained to me that those responsible for
NSS/Firefox prefer a click through failure because it m
Ben,
I reviewed what I think is the latest draft at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilson-wpkops-browser-processing-01, not the
Word doc attached to the previous message.
Section 2.1: Is it worth pointing out that root stores are not fixed? Not only
can they be extended via automatic do
It's now posted here -
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilson-wpkops-browser-processing-01
-Original Message-
From: wpkops [mailto:wpkops-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
i-barre...@izenpe.net
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2014 2:23 AM
To: b...@digicert.com; bruce.mor...@entrust.com
Cc: wpkops@
Hi Ben,
I´ll wait for your proposal but still don´t see it as a part of the trust
model. The cryptolibraries are "something" the browsers use to perform their
activities regarding the web PKI but IMHO are not related on how the browsers
(or the OS) accept a CA in their root stores or how a CA a
