On Wed Aug 20 16:09:05 2008, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
Peter Saint-Andre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Please do some research about TLS. It is not limited to using keys
> (e.g., read RFC 5054).
Then why are we only talking about keys and verifiying keys here,
and
not about secrets and verifiying secrets?
We're not, always.
Ekr, for instance, has been talking in terms of PAKE, a shared
secret, and session resumption, in a pretty convincing way. So
convincing, in fact, one could be forgiven for thinking he knew a
thing or two about this stuff.
In fact, I think certificates are actually the best approach, because
they're better understood, the IPR impact is clearer, they provide a
wide range of options for initial and subsequent authentication, and
both users and developers are more exposed to them, hence more likely
to accept and trust them. I think we have a solid base there from
leap-of-faith to fingerprinting to work with.
Technically speaking, Ekr's suggestion is probably the better one,
but I think it's not so much better that the benefits outweigh the
political and usability advantages of self-signed certificates.
Dave.
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