On Fri, Sep 11, 2009 at 5:53 PM, David Conrad <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sep 7, 2009, at 9:12 AM, Randy Bush wrote: >> >> [1] - what i have seen in the sidr wg has driven me into the group which >> is extremely concerned about the rirs controling routing given >> their clear lack of altruism for the health of the internet. > > I, perhaps more than most, have had the recent 'joyful' experience of trying > to get a security system that has a hierarchical trust model actually > deployed. Suffice it to say, it is a non-trivial exercise in non-technical > negotiation. From my perhaps biased perspective it would seem that while > conceptually and technically, hierarchical trust models are nice and elegant > and simple, they do NOT easily map into political and economic realities > which are decidedly non-hierarchical. As a result, deployment has required > a tremendous amount of time and thrust to actually make appreciable forward > progress.
Today, in some respects, there is a hierarchy in place for the routing system, the RADb/IRR datasets which are used to generate route filters. Hopefully the 'next best thing' will include some bits to easily verify authorization to announce/use the address blocks in question, something slightly more accurate than: route: 216.239.63.0/24 descr: REACH (Customer Route) tech-c: RRNOC1-REACH origin: AS24077 remarks: This auto-generated route object was created remarks: for a REACH customer route vs: route: 216.239.63.0/24 descr: Google origin: AS15169 notify: [email protected] mnt-by: MAINT-AS15169 changed: [email protected] 20090902 source: RADB which one should be used? Today you don't really know so happily AS24077: aut-num: AS24077 as-name: TMHK-Transit-AS-HK-AP descr: TMHK Global Transit country: HK person: Raymond Tong nic-hdl: RT236-AP e-mail: [email protected] Can happily announce a bunch of things that aren't theirs to announce :( oops... In the first stage of 'tomorrow-tomorrow-land' hopefully we'll be able to distinguish who's the right origin-AS. In the next stage we may even be able to tell what AS-PATH's are proper. > I will admit some skepticism that this will be remotely acceptable, either > in a political or business sense. As such, I have to assume I misunderstand > something fundamental about the intent or trust model of SIDR. Could someone > enlighten me why enterprises, ISPs, or governments who are NOT the roots of > this system won't recoil in horror at even the idea that their parents, > grandparents, great-grandparents, etc. in the trust hierarchy potentially > could, by intent, whim, or error, instantly and completely remove their > ability to send/receive Internet traffic[1]? I'm not sure there's a good answer to this, today we all depend upon some level of trust with the 'IRR system' which we don't have any real contractual relationship with, save individual relationships with 'RADb' the others (alt-db, l3-db, reach-db...) all are blindly trusted. Tomorrow we'd have some relationship (hopefully) with an RIR (which we have today, save legacy folk). Yes, the RIR's of the world will have to step up and provide bullet-proof services, potentially scaled up far more than what's in place today, and potentially geographically dispersed, diverse and redundant... -chris _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
