Sandy, On Sep 17, 2009, at 5:59 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote:
I recognize that there is an fear that this system somehow puts ISPs under someone's control. I would answer that there is not any more control than is already the case.
I suppose it depends on what people are going to do with RPKI. Today, RIR influence on routing is essentially advisory in nature -- if an address holder (say) fails to pay their address maintenance fee, RIRs can, at most, remove the address holder's blocks from whois databases. However, as I understand it, this has limited effect on existing contractual relationships between the address holders and the folks who already announce their space (it may have more effect on address holders who are attempting to find new ISPs to announce their space). The RIR could potentially reallocate the space, but this would likely be a good way of annoying multiple parties (not just the folks the address space was reclaimed from).
If RPKI does not change this, then you're right -- there is not any more control. However, if filter lists are built or routers check origin authenticity in real-time by traversing the RPKI tree(s), there would seem to be significantly more control vested in each parent node in the path up to the root of the RPKI hierarchy. My fear is that this will simply be unacceptable in a political or business sense.
Regards, -drc _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
