On Mon, 5 Apr 2010, Danny McPherson wrote:
On Apr 5, 2010, at 2:01 AM, Robert Kisteleki wrote:
I disagree with this. I think that spending hours and hours on specifying,
debating, coding, testing, etc. a feature that is used in 0.02% (or 0.003%,
depending on how you count) of the cases is not a good investment, imo.
Such an underused feature will not have a well tested codebase, with all
possible bugs ironed out, which is a recipe for security problems.
My point was, it's all about perspective. Whether you like it or not,
not accommodating those networks when adding new capabilities, when
those routes are perfectly legitimate (i.e., within spec of a standards
track document) and work just fine today, is inappropriate.
There's also the point to be concerned about, which is defining the
validation of BGP routes to handle an AS_SET origin, to avoid creating a
way for an attacker to counter the validation check.
No matter how few times the feature is used in practice, the feature
exists in BGP and in the implemented code. Not used in practice does not
mean it could not be used in malice.
So, for a wild example, suppose the validation check looked to see if one
single AS in the origin AS_SET matched a valid ROA for the prefix, and
passed the BGP route as valid. That would give a malicious person a way
to ensure that their bogus route would be accepted. If on the other hand,
the validation code looked to see if all ASs in the AS_SET matched a valid
ROA, that might break legitimate uses.
We need a defined way to deal with AS_SETs that doesn't afford
opportunities for the malicious source while still permitting either the
accidental or the rare intentional use.
--Sandy
As I've stated before, if we do things in SIDR that introduce new
constraints on what and how people are doing something today that's
completely within the bounds of legitimacy, then we ought to have a
darn good reason to do so.
That said, it might be less resource intensive to just contact those
folks originating AS_SETs and convince them they don't need'm -
assuming they don't.
-danny
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