> ....
> So, for a wild example, suppose the validation check looked to see if one
> single AS in the origin AS_SET matched a valid ROA for the prefix, and
> passed the BGP route as valid.  That would give a malicious person a way
> to ensure that their bogus route would be accepted.  If on the other hand,
> the validation code looked to see if all ASs in the AS_SET matched a valid
> ROA, that might break legitimate uses.
> .... 
> --Sandy

Sandy's hypothetical attack example as well John's original message made me 
think about 
enumerating all the use-case scenarios for {Prefix, Origin} validation with 
AS-sets.

These are the use-case scenarios that I am able enumerate when the origin in an 
update is an 
AS-set (please let me know if you can think of any other reasonable use case 
that is not listed below):

A1: The AS-set consists of a single unrepeated ASN; No ROA exists with a 
covering prefix.
A2: The AS-set consists of a single unrepeated ASN; ROA exists with a covering 
prefix; AS mismatch.
A3: The AS-set consists of a single unrepeated ASN; ROA exists with a covering 
prefix; AS match.

B1: The AS-set contains the same ASN repeated multiple (>1) times and no other 
ASNs; No ROA exists with a covering prefix.
B2: The AS-set contains the same ASN repeated multiple (>1) times and no other 
ASNs; ROA exists with a covering prefix; AS mismatch.
B3: The AS-set contains the same ASN repeated multiple (>1) times and no other 
ASNs; ROA exists with a covering prefix; AS match.

C1: The AS-set contains at least two distinct ASNs; No ROA exists with a 
covering prefix.
C2: The AS-set contains at least two distinct ASNs; multiple ROAs exist with a 
covering prefix; AT LEAST ONE of the ASNs in the AS set DOES NOT MATCH with any 
ASN from the collective set of ASNs in said multiple ROAs.
C3: The AS-set contains at least two distinct ASNs; multiple ROAs exist with a 
covering prefix; EVERY ONE of the ASNs in the AS set MATCHES with an ASN from 
the collective set of ASNs in said multiple ROAs.

There are two essential things that the address-resource owner needs to be made 
aware of about validation:
1. In the long run, when deployment is deemed complete, an update with an AS 
set will be considered Invalid except in cases A3, B3, and C3.
2. NO concession is made during validation by way of aggregation of more 
specific prefixes in ROAs to “effectively” create a ROA for a less specific 
prefix. 
Example: Existence of the following four ROAs, namely, ROA-1: {10.1.0.0/18, 
AS64496}, ROA-2: {10.1.64.0/18, AS64497}, ROA-3: {10.1.128.0/18, AS64498}, 
ROA-4: {10.1.192.0/18, AS64499} WILL NOT by itself result in positive 
validation of an update that has the aggregate prefix 10.1.0.0/16 with the AS 
set {AS64496, AS64497, AS64498, AS64499} as origin.

Note: Sandy’s hypothetical attack scenario is easily mitigated if the outcome 
of validation in use case C2 is always “Invalid.” The algorithms should be 
designed to carefully consider all of the nine use-case scenarios listed above 
(assuming we are not missing any that are of any consequence).

Sriram
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