[I was under the impression that the working practice of this WG is for the co-chairs to either explicitly state their particular role and interests in making each and every posting, or, if any such explicit disclaimers are missing, then its reasonable for the WG participants to assume that the Co-Chairs' postings are related specifically to matters that fall within the purview of the functions of a WG chair. To what extent this current thread of enumeration of proxy aggregation use cases relates to the procedures of the WG or a consensus call is not clear to me, so I am a bit puzzled as to why one WG co-chair appears to be so engaged in this thread in what I can only assume is a WG Chair role.]
To quote RFC 4271: When a BGP speaker aggregates several routes for the purpose of advertisement to a particular peer, the AS_PATH of the aggregated route normally includes an AS_SET formed from the set of ASes from which the aggregate was formed. I use the term "proxy aggregation" to describe this action - others may have different terms to describe this practice. The efforts to conflate security credentials associated with origination and proxy aggregation have been less than successful, and as John Scudder pointed out its probably a far more direct path to look at origination and proxy aggregation as distinct. So, in that vein, I'm still comfortable in using the text I proposed earlier in response to John's original observation, namely: "A route's "origin AS" is the final element of the route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an AS Set, indicating that the route is an aggregate, then the origin AS cannot be determined." This wording, in effect, leaves the entire issue of proxy aggregation and the associated security credentials that would allow relying parties to be assured of the integrity of the proxy aggregation action to be validated by some to-be-determined mechanism that is not necessarily a ROA. In thinking more about the original suggestion of John's it strikes me that an effort to shoehorn the specification of security credentials relating to proxy aggregation into the current constraints of a ROA is not going to be a productive one. Geoff _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
