Geoff Huston wrote:
> On 29/04/2010, at 5:24 AM, Chris Morrow wrote:
>
>>
>> Sandra Murphy wrote:
>>> The relative frequency of use of AS_SETs is interesting, but not really
>>> germane to the point here.
>>>
>>> If we were trying to develop a protection for AS_SETs then we might want
>>> to ask the engineering question of where and how often they were used.
>>>
>>> But for the purpose of validating received updates, we need a rule for
>>> what is done with AS_SETs that appear in the AS_PATH origin. Lack of
>>> rules leaves opportunities for deliberate or accidental mischief.
>>>
>>> AS_SETs might not be used very often, but that doesn't stop someone from
>>> using AS_SETs deliberately with malicious intent.
>> right so as a starting point:
>> "AS_SET in an origin is unvalidatable."
("on reciept" i forgot to add)
>>
>> how about that? (I think this is fine since:
>> 1) they aren't used in production very much anymore
>> 2) where used, they seem to be mis-used
>> 3) the rules for how you do verification/validation of an AS_SET are at
>> best murky.
>>
>> -chris
>> (regular user)
>>
>
>
> You ask: "how about that?"
>
> That still works for me. Ironically (or any other adjective that matches - I
> can think of quite a few more extreme ones that I could substitute) this is
> _precisely_ where all this started when I proposed using the following
> definition of an "origin AS" (in my note from 4 April):
>
> "A route's "origin AS" is the final element of the route object's
> AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an AS Set,
> indicating that the route is an aggregate, then the origin AS
> cannot be determined."
cool, so I actually only did half the problem (reciept), on send as well
we'd have to say: "If you are sending an update (announce or withdrawal)
and that update's origin is an AS_SET, you can not sign the update."
I think that makes sense because you can't determine which AS in the
AS_SET should do the signing?
-chris
(again as a regular user)
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