May be we could include a BCP statement or warning within the
algorithm document for the (very few) users of AS sets.
If they use, for example, [AS42] or [AS42, AS42] type of AS set
for whatever reason (i.e., with singleton AS in the AS set
or the same ASN repeated multiple times) and also register a ROA for their
prefix with that ASN (AS42 in the example) --
the BCP statement would warn them that
their ROA would thwart a potential hijacker of their prefix but
they should not expect to receive a positive ("Valid") assertion for their
own update which contains that AS set as origin.
Also, the same applies for cases when they actually do a genuine proxy
aggregation such as using an AS set [AS42, AS43, AS44] for example
and register three ROAs for their aggregate prefix for each
of the three ASNs. Again, they should not expect a positive ("Valid")
assertion for their own update which contains that AS set as origin.
Sriram
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Geoff
> Huston
> Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2010 2:06 AM
> To: Chris Morrow
> Cc: Sandra Murphy; sidr wg
> Subject: Re: [sidr] SIDR Charter Question
>
>
> On 29/04/2010, at 5:24 AM, Chris Morrow wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Sandra Murphy wrote:
> >> The relative frequency of use of AS_SETs is interesting, but not really
> >> germane to the point here.
> >>
> >> If we were trying to develop a protection for AS_SETs then we might want
> >> to ask the engineering question of where and how often they were used.
> >>
> >> But for the purpose of validating received updates, we need a rule for
> >> what is done with AS_SETs that appear in the AS_PATH origin. Lack of
> >> rules leaves opportunities for deliberate or accidental mischief.
> >>
> >> AS_SETs might not be used very often, but that doesn't stop someone from
> >> using AS_SETs deliberately with malicious intent.
> >
> > right so as a starting point:
> > "AS_SET in an origin is unvalidatable."
> >
> > how about that? (I think this is fine since:
> > 1) they aren't used in production very much anymore
> > 2) where used, they seem to be mis-used
> > 3) the rules for how you do verification/validation of an AS_SET are at
> > best murky.
> >
> > -chris
> > (regular user)
> >
>
>
> You ask: "how about that?"
>
> That still works for me. Ironically (or any other adjective that matches - I
> can think of quite
> a few more extreme ones that I could substitute) this is _precisely_ where
> all this started
> when I proposed using the following definition of an "origin AS" (in my note
> from 4 April):
>
> "A route's "origin AS" is the final element of the route object's
> AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an AS Set,
> indicating that the route is an aggregate, then the origin AS
> cannot be determined."
>
>
>
> Geoff
>
>
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