On 12/06/2010, at 8:08 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>
> Finally, as I noted in my comments on the repository structure I-D on 5/26,
> and in my review and suggested edits of that document posted a few days
> before, I am still wondering why we need to change the name of CA when we
> rekey it. This is not normally mandated in a PKI, although we are free to
> impose such a requirement for the RPKI if appropriate. I even generated text
> for the resource certificate profile to specify how to do this, using a
> combination of the common name and serial number attributes. (This was
> proposed as a way to accommodate the need to change the CA name, while
> retaining some part of it that might be a locally significant ID, e.g., a
> database key.) While I don't see a problem with performing key rollover and
> algorithm migration if we have to retain this requirement, I do believe that
> we ought to document the rationale for it.
The requirement was introduced into the res-cert draft in response to a review
comment from David Cooper:
3) Section 3.9.5 states:
In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair.
The scope of a CRL MUST be all certificates issued by the issuing CA
unless the CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension. So, if
the scope of CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a given
key pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the
issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from performing
key rollover. The latter option may be implemented by having issuers
change names whenever changing the key pair used to sign certificates.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg00476.html (and the
ensuing brief thread).
Geoff
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