Folks,
Please note that draft 12 is the same as draft 13 except for the
end-of-line characters. So you should compare 13 to 11 (or an earlier
version depending on when you last reviewed the document.)
NOTE: Version 13 has end-of-line characters (linefeeds) that Rfcdiff
will handle. However, as uploaded, versions 9, 10, 11, and 12 have
carriage returns as their end-of-line characters and don't work with
Rfcdiff. I believe that if you substitute LF for all the CRs, Rfcdiff
will work with them. I'm told that downloading with IE automatically
does the end-of-line changes. And Word let me select the end-of-line
terminator when I used it to open and then save the files.
In addition to some clarifications, addition of references, and
correction of typos and minor errors, the following revisions were
made between draft 11 and 12/13 to address feedback from Tim Polk and
Sean Turner.
Karen
1. Introduction
From: Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647.
A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from
this policy because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
retained the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to
facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of the RFC.
To: Note: This document is based on the template specified in the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document RFC 3647
[RFC3647]. In the interest of keeping the document as short as
reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template are
omitted from this policy because they did not apply to this PKI.
However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
the RFC to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
the RFC. Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
stipulation" in CP/CPS parlance.
1.2. Overview -- replaced 2nd paragraph with 2 paragraphs
From: This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
below the RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
To: The structure of the RPKI is modeled on the existing organizational
structure that is already responsible for IP address and AS number
resource allocation. In this allocation hierarchy, IANA allocates
resources to five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), each of which
manages address and AS number allocation within a defined
geopolitical region. The RIRs in turn allocate resources to Internet
Service Providers, to subscribers with so-called provider-
independent ("portable") allocations, and in some regions, to
National Internet Registries (NIRs). (The term LIR is used in some
regions to refer to what other regions define as an ISP. Throughout
the rest of this document we will use the term ISP to simplify
references to these entities.)
As noted in the RPKI architecture document [ARCH], although IANA
and/or the five RIRs are obvious candidates to be default TAs for
the RPKI, each RP ultimately chooses the set of trust anchors it
will use for certificate validation. For example, an RP (e.g., an
LIR/ISP) could create a trust anchor to which all address space
and/or all AS numbers are assigned, and for which the RP knows the
corresponding private key. The RP could then issue certificates
under this trust anchor to whatever entities in the PKI it wishes,
with the result that the certification paths terminating at this
locally-installed trust anchor will satisfy the RFC 3779 validation
requirements.
1.4.1. Certification authorities -- 2nd paragraph
From: Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.
To: Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
also act as CAs when they create EE certificates. Subscribers with
PI space are the principle examples of this class of CAs.
1.6.4. CP approval procedures
From: IESG MUST approve a replacement BCP, following the procedures of the
IETF Standards Process as defined in RFC 2026.
To: The IESG MUST approve a replacement BCP that either updates or
obsoletes this BCP, following the procedures of the IETF Standards
Process as defined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026].
1.7 Definitions and acronyms
Added:
LIR - In some regions, the term Local Internet Registry (LIR) is
used to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
Provider-independent (PI) address space - PI address space is
allocated directly by an Internet Registry to a subscriber. This space
cannot be further allocated by the subscriber to other entities. The
subscriber must contract with an ISP to obtain routing of the address
block within the Internet. PI space enables the subscriber to change
service providers without renumbering its networks and to use multiple
ISPs in a multi-homed configuration.
2.2 Publication of certification information
Added:
Each CA MUST publish its CPS.
3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
From: The Subject name in each certificate MUST be unique relative to all
Subject names certified by the same Issuer, but the name does not
need to be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee,
that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
applications that make use of attestations of Internet resource
holding, not for identification. The PKI binds a public key to sets
of INRs. The name of the holder of the INR is not intended to be
"meaningful".
To: The Subject name in each certificate does not need to be meaningful.
The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet
resource holdings, not for identification. The PKI binds a public
key to sets of INRs. The name of the holder of the INR is not
intended to be "meaningful".
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
From: Each CA certifies Subject names that MUST be unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
enforced through technical means.
To: There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
PKI. Each CA certifies Subject names that MUST be unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within
the RPKI cannot be guaranteed.
However, Subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a
way that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
assigned the same name.
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
From: Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.
To: Since Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no
provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks,
etc. When generating subject names, CAs should use a mechanism that
is unlikely to result in Subject names that include trademarks,
service marks, etc. CAs MUST NOT knowingly issue a certificate with
a Subject name that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined
infringes on the trademark of another individual or organization.
4.2. Certificate application processing
From: CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. Each CA MUST define the
certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its CPS.
To: CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Section 6 of the resource certificate
profile [RFCyyyy] defines the standard certificate request formats
that MUST be supported
Each CA MUST define the certificate request/response standards that
it employs, via its CPS.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage -- last paragraph
From: If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party
MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the
algorithms specified in RFC 5280 and RFC 3779.
To: If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party
MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
certificate profile [RFCyyyy], which specifies the extended
validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.
4.6 Certificate renewal
Added: This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
an old one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the
serial number are changed. The public key and all other information
remain the same.
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal -- first paragraph.
Added: An overlap period of at least 24 hours is RECOMMENDED.
Sections 4.X.4, 4.X.5, 4.X.6, 4.X.7
Made consistent with each other as follows:
4.6.4, 4.7.4, 4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2.
4.6.5, 4.7.5, 4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a [renewal,
re-keyed, modified] certificate
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1.
4.6.6, 4.7.6, 4.8.6 Publication of the [renewal, rekeyed, modified]
certificate by the CA
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2.
4.6.7, 4.7.7, 4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to
other entities
No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.3.
4.7. Certificate re-key
Added: This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an
old one because the key needs to be replaced. Unlike with certificate
renewal, the public key is changed.
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key -- 3rd paragraph
From: Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
public key rather than a new key.
To: Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
public key rather than a new key. This applies to when one is
adding INRs (revocation not required) and to when one is removing
INRs (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1).
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
From: A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
revocation. A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when
revoking a certificate, however this notification requirement MAY be
satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer. If means other than
CRL publication are employed, the CPS for a CA MUST indicate by what
means the CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation,
To: A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
revocation. This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
and MUST be authenticated. The procedures for making the request
MUST be described in the CPS for each CA. The RPKI provisioning
document [PROV] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
revocation requests.
A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
certificate. The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
publication. The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.
4.10. Certificate status services
From: This PKI does not make provision for use of OCSP or SCVP, because it
is anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire
and validate certificates for all participating resource holders on
a daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-
scale, bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all
changed or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the
anticipated mode of certificate status verification.
To: This PKI does not make provision for use of OCSP or SCVP, because it
is anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols
are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
checking. RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is
RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but
no more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
accesses).
5.1. Physical controls
Added: Possible topics include:
. Site location and construction, such as the construction
requirements for high-security zones and the use of locked
rooms, cages, safes, and cabinets
. Physical access, i.e., mechanisms to control access from one
area of the facility to another or access into high-security
zones, such as locating CA operations in a secure computer room
monitored by guards or security alarms and requiring movement
from zone to zone to be accomplished using a token, biometric
readers, and/or access control lists
. Power and air conditioning
. Water exposures
. Fire prevention and protection
. Media storage, for example, requiring the storage of backup
media in a separate location that is physically secure and
protected from fire and water damage
. Waste disposal
. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
Added: Topics covered SHOULD include:
. Requirements for recognizing trusted roles
. Responsibilities for each role (Examples of trusted roles
include system administrators, security officers, and system
auditors.)
. For each task identified, the number of individuals required
to perform the task (n out of m rule) for each role.
. Identification and authentication requirements for each role
. When role separation is employed and how it is effected (if
employed)
5.4.1. Types of events recorded -- 2nd sentence
From: Audit records SHOULD include the date, time, responsible user
or process, and summary content data relating to the event.
To: Audit records MUST include the date, time, responsible user
or process, and summary content data relating to the event.
Also added the following auditable events:
. Key generation
. Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
. Clock adjustments
5.8. CA or RA termination
From: In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA authoritative for the
specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures
associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS
for that CA.
To: In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA authoritative for the
specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures
associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS
for that CA. These procedures MUST include a provision to notify
each entity that issued a certificate to the organization that is
operating the CA that is terminating.
Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
as the CA (see Section 1.4.2), there are no separate stipulations
for RAs.
6.1.1. Key pair generation
Added sentence in the middle of the paragraph:
(The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it generates
them (see 6.1.6)).
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
From: The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers.
To: The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA
generates the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
From: The INRs held by RIRs and the NIRs periodically change because these
registries receive new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate for
their certificates to hae lifetimes that match the periodicity of these
changes
To: The INRs held by a CA may periodically change because it receives
new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate for its certificate to
hae a lifetime that matches the periodicity of these changes.
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
From: The IESG MUST provide at least a six month advance notice of a
change to this CP.
To: Successive versions of the CP will be published with the statement
"This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY." MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum
of 6 months from the date of publication.
10. Security Considerations
Added: Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
CRLs under the same Issuer name. Path validation implementations
that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
[see RFCyyyy] verify that the same key was used to sign both the
target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL. So a
name collision will not change the result. Use of the basic X.509
path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
certificate being rejected as revoked. Relying parties must ensure
that the software they use to validate certificates issued under
this policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFCyyyy].
13.1. Normative References
Added:
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process - Revision 3,"
BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers," RFC 3779, June 2004.
13.2. Informative References
Added:
[PROV] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A Protocol
for Provisioning Resource Certificates," work in progress.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., Wu, S.,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and
Certification Practices Framework," RFC 3647, November 2003.
_______________________________________________
sidr mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr