Thank you Karen for this work.

I have a question regarding 1.6.3., a section that was always confusing
to me.

It says:

> 1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy
> 
>    The IESG MUST judge consensus of the IETF community for changes to
>    this policy.

But from my reading of RFC3647 the suitability that is meant here is
"whether a CA should be allowed to operate within or interoperate with a
PKI". If that is indeed the case, I am not sure if the IESG plays any
role here.

If we look at the current INR distribution system, such determination is
done by a parent registry by establishing business relationships and
allocating resources downstream. Usually, there are certain checks and
conditions in place and checking for all the MUSTS in the CPS and
approving it might be included. That would be, IMO, the most natural way
of building a compliant RPKI.

However, I don't think we need this in the CP, at least not at this
stage of RPKI development. I'd recommend that we make 1.6.3. "not
applicable" and relax the requirements for the CPS, by removing all
"MUST"s that must be in there, including the requirement that each CA
MUST publish a CPS.

In general, I agree with most of the previous comments and think that
the CP itself won't make routing more secure. I'd prefer to have this
document as lightweight and simple as possible and hope it can be
published as an RFC before the RIRs start issuing production certificates.

Thanks,

Andrei

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