Randy,

On Tue, 26 Apr 2011, Randy Bush wrote:

It doesn't seem to be a new problem to me. How is this time problem
evaluated in the current off-line cache software?

from draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr

  As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
  dependent, servers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
  approximately an hour.

Why think of another approach if the only difference is the device
doing the validation of certs and ROA's?

same approach.  just trying to throw in a bit more detail for two
reasons

If it is the same approach, why detail this more? It is a MUST time settings are correct, and let router vendors take care of the 'tolerance of approximately an hour' implementation.

Beside this, I just read the draft-ymbk-bgpsec-ops draft and the detail you're now trying to get into the document seems a bit odd to me.

I think the time-issues should be noted where validation is described and that operational considerations aren't the right place for this.

Jac

 o brian beat me up

 o in bgpsec, the router might not validate but still sign and pass on.
   it is signing to attest to "i saw this" not that it believed it.
   subtle.

randy


--
Jac Kloots
Network Services
SURFnet bv
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