So.. this spun along for a time, the last real bit of controversy was "to AO or not to AO"... The author(s) I think are off looking at alternate options. For now we'll withdraw this WGLC and start another once the authors have updates to report.
thanks though folks! -Chris On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 1:31 PM, Joe Touch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 4/28/2011 6:27 AM, t.petch wrote: >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Joe Touch"<[email protected]> >> To: "t.petch"<[email protected]> >> Cc: "Christopher Morrow"<[email protected]>; "sidr wg list" >> <[email protected]> >> Sent: Monday, April 25, 2011 5:26 PM >> >>> Hi, Tom, >>> >>> On 4/25/2011 1:47 AM, t.petch wrote: >>> .... >>>> >>>> I think that the point is not that it is or is not a BGP connection >>>> but that security for BGP was predicated on the assumption that >>>> the TCP connection would be short in terms of hops, ie none, >>>> and it was that that made a less stringent approach to security >>>> acceptable, one that would not be acceptable for an Internet >>>> wide access for - say - a Web site. >>> >>> Hopcount security, i.e., GTSM (RFC 3682) is not at all related to TCP-AO. >> >> Understood; I was thinking of RFC4278 which calls out the unusual nature >> of >> BGP sessions and the impact on security requirements. > > That document explains why TCP MD5 was considered appropriate for BGP, given > the variance in the maturity level of the standards of the two docs. > > TCP-AO has no such assertions or qualifications. It is a general purpose > mechanism that includes some properties useful for BGP, but that are also > very relevant to exchanges between clients and caches as well. > >> I am familiar with TCP-AO from the TCPM list, but am not enough of a >> cryptanalyst to know whether or not it is appropriate for rpki-rtr. >> >> By contrast, I have seen SSH and TLS discussed much more extensively >> on their lists and have been part of the pain of adding them to syslog and >> SNMP. >> >> And I do not know where these rpki-rtr sessions will go to and from but >> suspect that they will not be BGP-like. > > BGP-like presumably means: > - long lived > - between known endpoints > - over short IP hops > > Of these, only "long lived" had any impact on the TCP-AO design. > > Of these, any can be relevant to rpki-rtr sessions, from the traffic I've > seen on this list. > > Keying is another relevant issue; configuration of SSH and TLS for > pre-shared keys is different than for TCP MD5 (and TCP-AO, which uses > similar master keys), and not the typical case. > > My point is that TCP-AO wasn't designed for BGP; it was designed as a > general purpose mechanism. > > Joe > > _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
