On Fri, 3 Jun 2011, Uma Chunduri wrote:
....
True, privacy through SSH is overkill but strong AUTH is *critical*, I feel:
- TCP-MD5 should not be considered (as it is any ways deprecated and it's MD5)
- TCP-AO has only slight advantage as it has less overhead than ipsec-AH even
when
deployed with manual keys
- but it's better if it is "MUST support authentication of nodes with TCP-AO or
ipsec-AH" because
Just to be sure:
Did you understand the part about implementations of TCP-AO and ipsec-AH
not being available at present?
I.e., you recognize this forces a delay in implementation of the protocol
(and accept the consequent impact on deployment of the RPKI)?
--Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair
as both support
- strong auth algos
- algo agility
- can be deployed with manual and auto key management
(auto key probably required eventually, once with lot of connections
at
cache/global RPKI/server side and for automatic key
changes periodically)
- key changes for existing sessions
One would get flexibility with this.
Also Section 7 (page 16)
"It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of band by some
reasonably secured means"
This will be still applicable but only if TCP-AO/ipsce-AH are deployed with
manual keys.
2 cents,
-Uma
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