Terry,

Please see inline.

Roque

On Jul 19, 2012, at 2:51 AM, Terry Manderson wrote:

> Roque and Steve,
> 
> Firstly I think that the ability to specify multiple repositories for the
> TAL is warranted. 

(Roque) ok.

> I spent some time 6 months ago thinking this through and circulated a rough
> format that was:
> 

(Roque) Good, I was not aware.

> 3 ; rsync://rrs.me.org/TA/root.cer ; rsync://rrs.friend.net/TA/root.cer ;
> rsync://rrs.them.com/TA/root.cer
> MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
> GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
> Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
> nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
> BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
> ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
> aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
> 
> So very similar to what you propose, the only semantic difference is that
> the number of locations is provided. That has varying degrees of mileage
> depending on your point of view.

(Roque) We can discuss the particular semantic. 

> 
> I see the multiple locations in the TAL as the 'avoidance' on any circular
> or even single dependencies of protocol, DNS name->IPvX address, and routing
> domain. (irrespective of how the service provision is constructed those are
> the three basic building blocks)
> 
> In looking at the TAL contents, should more URIs be added the premise must
> be that they are all equal in the eyes of the publisher. The relying party
> then may make their own decision. But I would suggest that only one URI
> selection REOMMENDATION be provided, ie 1) by the closest (RTT) location, 2)
> protocol preferece (if HTTP makes it there), 3) order of the TAL. or
> whatever the WG decides if this item is adopted.

(Roque)That is what we are proposing in section 3.2 

> 
> I also see that you seem to be (section 4) updating the SIA interpretation
> in RFC6487, the SIA ordering suggests:
> 
> "The ordering of URIs in this accessDescription sequence reflect the CA's
> relative preferences for access methods to be used by RPs, with the first
> element of the sequence being the most preferred by the CA."
> I don't mind if you update it, but the ruleset changes from the ordered
> preference by the SIA publisher, to one enacted by the relying party.
> 

(Roque) As you mentioned, I am in favor on moving the decision to the RP. This 
may mean updating RFC 6487 if the WG decides.


> While I think that its nice to say that IP addresses are covered by ROAs - I
> don't see that as something that is a must as it might be a hindrance down
> the road and wouldn't that in itself be a circular dependency?
> 
> So, probably we need to do somethingAt the time I thought over this I 
> promised to write some text about it after
> publication of the RFC (RFC6490), I didn't - so I am supremely glad you
> have! :-)
> 
> One of the reasons that I didn't make any exerted efforts to put pen to
> paper is that I kept coming back to this paragraph in 6490
> 
>   The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure [RFC5914]
>   adopted as a PKIX standard.  That standard could be used to represent
>   the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data
>   structure.  However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors
>   prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and the RPKI implementer
>   community has elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define
>   the requisite extension.  The community also prefers the simplicity
>   of the ASCII encoding of the TAL versus the binary (ASN.1) encoding
>   for TrustAnchorInfo.
> 
> Should we revisit this and form the appropriate PKIX extensions? If not, why
> not?

(Roque) I do not think so. The WG analyzed and dropped the CMS proposal already.

> Cheers
> Terry
> 
> On 19/07/12 1:47 AM, "Stephen Kent" <k...@bbn.com> wrote:
> 
>> Roque,
>> 
>>> Hi Steve,
>>> 
>>> Thanks for your comments.
>>> 
>>> I tried to extract the most relevant for discussion on text format.
>>> 
>>> 1) Section 2: RFC 6487 limitation to multiple Repository Publication Points.
>>> 
>>> Comment: "6487 says that, for AIA: In this profile, a single reference to 
>>> the
>>> publication point of the immediate superior certificate MUST be present,
>>> ŠThat RFC later says that it¹s OK to have other types of accessMethods, 
>>> which
>>> contradicts the earlier text. In any case, the latter text prohibits 
>>> multiple
>>> instances of the same method (e.g., rynch) so Š"
>>> 
>>> (Roque) In summary, RFC 5280 allows multiple "accessMethod + 
>>> accessLocation".
>>> However, RFC 6487 has the contradiction that you pointed out that would
>>> prevent not only multiple Repository Publication Points but also for the AIA
>>> to allow RSYNC + HTTP support (something we have commented in this list).
>>> Although we know that today the AIA has in practice little use, I think we
>>> would need to update RFC 6487 in the text to remove the reference to the
>>> "single reference".
>> It's not a contradiction for 6487 to be more restrictive in this
>> respect. 6487 imposes a number of restrictions relative to 5280. So, if
>> we decide to change 6487 it should be because we decide that
>> we need the flexibility, not because 6487 was inconsistent wrt AIA vs.
>> SIA and CRLDP.
>> 
>>> 2) Section 3:
>>> "In order to increase robustness, It is RECOMMENDED that a different FQDN
>>> could be resolved to IP addresses included in ROA objects from different CAs
>>> and hosted in diverse Repository Publication Points."
>>> 
>>> Comment:"I can¹t understand the latter part of this sentence."
>>> 
>>> (Roque) The idea is that the different FQDN: rpki.operator1.org,
>>> rpki.operator2.net resolve respectively to IP1 and IP2 addresses. So, those
>>> two addresses are recommended to be covered by different ROAs, even
>>> administrated by different CAs. Again, the idea is to increase diversity and
>>> to avoid any sort of circular dependency.
>> Good idea, but not well explained in the text. Also, this takes some
>> effort, if the FQDN might
>> resolve to multiple addresses and we have to check all of them against a
>> set of ROAs. How would this work for an anycast address?
>>> 3) Section 3.2
>>> "A RP can use different rules to select the URI from which to fetch the 
>>> Trust
>>> Anchor certificate."
>>> Comment: "Is this a good recommendation?"
>>> 
>>> (Roque) The idea here was to imitate the DNS behavior and let the RP to have
>>> their "secret sauce" to chose the operator. Normally what you want is to
>>> chose the closest one, that is why in DNS you keep track of the response 
>>> time
>>> from the different servers.
>> We already have the ability to use DNS for pub point diversity, as your
>> text noted. I think it might be preferable to give CAs a different
>> mechanism with more tightly-defined semantics to influence RP behavior
>> re RPKI data retrieval when we introduce these additional mechanisms.
>> 
>> Steve
>> _______________________________________________
>> sidr mailing list
>> sidr@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

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