A bit of history here. After RFC6485 was published, it was discovered that it incorrectly used the same OID for all RPKI crypto uses, which conflicts with CMS specs and is inconsistent with known implementations.
The wg decided to create RFC6485bis, to correct the OID problem and the OID problem only, with emphasis on the “only”. The “SHOULD” language in section 5 is inherited from RFC6485, except for: The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms is specified in [RFC6916] RFC6916, which was published a year after RFC6485, is "Algorithm Agility Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”. It describes the procedure to follow in transitioning from one algorithm/key size to another. Does RFC6916 satisfy your concerns about a change of algorithm? Would you prefer that RFC6485bis remove the inherited “SHOULD” language and point only to RFC6916? —Sandy On Nov 17, 2015, at 9:09 PM, Terry Manderson <terry.mander...@icann.org> wrote: > Terry Manderson has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-04: Discuss > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > DISCUSS: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I'm not so sure that this will be an easy DISCUSS to work through as I > view this in light of future sustainability/deployability of RPKI and any > protocol wedded to it (eg BGPSEC). > > Section 5 "Additional Requirements" suggests that both CAs and RPs > "SHOULD" be capable of supporting a transition and thus able to support > multiple RPKI alg. and key profiles. To me this "SHOULD" seems like it > invites fragility in any such transition. An immediate example would be > the root DNSSEC ksk rollover. An rather large amount of work is underway > to ascertain the impact. By leaving the SHOULDs in place is this walking > the same path? > > Let me ask another way. Under what situations is it actually appropriate > for a CA or RP to be able to ignore the requirement of being able to > support a phased introduction/deprecation of new/different RPKI algorithm > and key profiles? And if they ignore such a recommendation does this make > the entire RPKI infrastructure a fractured PKI by algorithm? > > > > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > sidr@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
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