The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC7115, "Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public Key 
Infrastructure (RPKI)". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7115&eid=4973

--------------------------------------
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Tassos Chatzithomaoglou <ach...@forthnet.gr>
Date Reported: 2017-03-18
Held by: Alvaro Retana (IESG)

Section: 3 & 5

Original Text
-------------
section 3
---------
For example, if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
   10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack cannot succeed
   against 10.0.666.0/24. 

section 5
---------
Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix
   10.0.0.0/16-24.  A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666
   would be Invalid

Corrected Text
--------------
section 3
---------
For example, if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
   10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack cannot succeed
   against 10.0.66.0/24. 

section 5
---------
Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix
   10.0.0.0/16-24.  A BGP announcement for 10.0.66.0/24 from AS 666
   would be Invalid


Notes
-----
666 is not a valid octet for an ipv4 address

===
I am marking this report as "Held for Document Update" [1], which means that 
the author might consider its merits for a future update.  If the use of the 
"666" octet was intentional, then a short note explaining might be appropriate 
to avoid further confusion.

- Alvaro.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/errata-processing.html

--------------------------------------
RFC7115 (draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-23)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public 
Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Publication Date    : January 2014
Author(s)           : R. Bush
Category            : BEST CURRENT PRACTICE
Source              : Secure Inter-Domain Routing
Area                : Routing
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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