On Friday 17 Aug 2007 10:09 am, Udhay Shankar N wrote: > What I was hoping to see were your thoughts on this: > "This suggests that Pakistan is only a crucial freedom step away from > success."
The statement that immediately precedes this is >Pakistan, meanwhile, has moved slowly on freedom. The state has >withdrawn from the >economy, but now grants favors selectively to the private sector, >with the inevitable >corollary of massive corruption and loss of freedom of action. It is not clear to me how this statement translates to "one crucial freedom step", which if taken, would magically rip away Pakistan's problems. However he redeems himself only partially in the sentence following the "freedom step" sentence, but even here he makes a blunder. I will explain >In reality, >the immediate future does not look promising because the country's >citizens do not have >the political will to achieve real change. It is a sad commentary >that Pakistan's choices for >the next cycle of political rule look like bad ones: Saying that Pakistan's citizens "do not have the political will to achieve real change" is a massive sweeping under the carpet of Pakistan's problems created by the rule of an oligarchy that has consistently voted to keep itself in power rather than risk being booted out by an electorate. I find it strange that this scholar takes pains to make comparisons between India and Pakistan where they appear similar. He bypasses the comparisons that point towards the reasons for the different paths that India and Pakistan have taken. One big blow struck for change in India was land reforms in which non resident landowners could not own huge tracts of land and the feudal trappings that went with them. Another major difference in India was apolitical armed forces, that stayed away from grabbing and retaining power. Democratic institutions that ensure that politicians who are voted out get out of power such as the judiciary and election commission were allowed to survive and gain a degree of public respect and acceptance in India. A third process in India that never occurred in Pakistan is the active manner in which caste differences were legislated out of day to day life to tilt forces away from a ruling high-caste elite towards leaders elected by mass appeal. The elite never lost power in Pakistan. A fourth factor was geopolitical ambition of an Islamist military elite who convinced themselves that military supremacy over the (cowardly Hindu) India was a given. This was a fundamental error, because conventional military victories call for a 2 or 3:1 numerical superiority of aggressor over defender. Pakistan, with its smaller size and economy could never muster that superiority. India on the other hand found it relatively easy to remain "defensive" by easily maintaining a 1.5 : 1 numerical superiority. So for 60 years Pakistan has spent up to 40% of its budget on the military, with the military empire ruling over every aspect of Pakistan, yet not involving over 90% of its people. Of the 3 billion US dollars that Dubya gives to Pakistan officially every year - 1.5 billion is military aid. US aid after 9-11 has been 22 billion. How much of that has inflated Pakistan's "growth rate" after 9-11 With respect, Dossani is either innocent and ignorant, or he writes just like the others. shiv
