http://blogs.forbes.com/firewall/2010/09/29/did-the-stuxnet-worm-kill-indias-
insat-4b-satellite/

Did The Stuxnet Worm Kill India’s INSAT-4B Satellite? 
Posted by Jeffrey Carr 
On July 7, 2010, a power glitch in the solar panels of India’s INSAT-4B 
satellite resulted in 12 of its 24 transponders shutting down. As a result, an 
estimated 70% of India’s Direct-To-Home (DTH) companies’ customers were 
without service. India’s DTH operators include Sun TV and state-run 
Doordarshan and data services of Tata VSNL.
INSAT-4B was put into orbit in March, 2007 by the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO), which conducts research and develops space technology for 
the government of India. It is also the agency which controls and monitors 
India’s satellites and space vehicles while they are operational.
Once it became apparent that INSAT-4B was effectively dead, SunDirect ordered 
its servicemen to redirect customer satellite dishes to point to ASIASAT-5, a 
Chinese satellite owned and operated by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co., 
Ltd (AsiaSat). AsiaSat’s two primary shareholders are General Electric and 
China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC), a state-owned 
company. China and India are competing with each other to see who will be the 
first to land another astronaut on the Moon. China has announced a date of 2025 
while India is claiming 2020.
What does this have to do with the Stuxnet worm that’s infected thousands of 
systems, mostly in India and Iran? India’s Space Research Organization is a 
Siemens customer. According to the resumes of two former engineers who worked 
at the ISRO’s Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre, the Siemens software in use is 
Siemens S7-400 PLC and SIMATIC WinCC, both of which will activate the Stuxnet 
worm.
I uncovered this information as part of my background research for a paper 
that I’m presenting at the Black Hat Abu Dhabi conference in November. My 
objective for that presentation will be to provide an analytic model for 
determining attribution in cases like Stuxnet. My objective for this post is 
simply to show that there are more and better theories to explain Stuxnet’s 
motivation than just Israel and Iran, as others have posited. My personal 
research won’t be available until after Black Hat Abu Dhabi, however I hope 
others will pick up this thread, give it a good yank, and see what unravels 
before then.

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