Hi Kai, >> This issue is totally independent from E.164 >> > > Not fully. SBCs may exchange the domain part of the E.164 SIP URI, which > causes a break of the RFC 4474 signature. With email-style URIs a simple > exchange is not possible. > This is true but this applies to SIP Identity in general and not to E.164 number usage with SIP Identity only. Hence, I would not tie it to this discussion.
> >> I don't like the idea of requiring DTLS-SRTP to provide proof of >> possession of the keying material. >> > > It is also the other way round. If you use DTLS-SRTP to encrypt RTP, the > terminating domain is interested where the call originates from and in > which domain the SRTP connection is terminated. DTLS-SRTP is not > initially used as mean to establish an identity rather than as the > initial aim to encrypt RTP. > I understand the need to know who the end points are. However, tying DTLS-SRTP is not a good idea since it a) increases the liklihood that SIP identity never get's deployed (since it is suddently far more complex than before) b) SIP identity is used also as a identity mechanism in areas where no media is exchanged. Ciao Hannes > Kai > > >> Ciao >> Hannes >> >> >> Elwell, John wrote: >> >>> SBCs do exist, often for good reasons that Hadriel has expanded on >>> already. I firmly believe that DTLS-SRTP will not be deployable in a >>> meaningful way without addressing this problem. Concerning >>> >> solutions, we >> >>> have drafts from Kai and Dan, or perhaps a merger of the two somehow >>> would work. It also depends to some extent whether we are >>> >> talking only >> >>> about email-style URIs or about E.164-based URIs too. >>> >>> John >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip >>> This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol >>> Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip >>> Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip >>> >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip >> This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol >> Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip >> Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip >> >> _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
