> On 7/9/08 4:45 PM, Dan Wing wrote: > >> On 7/9/08 4:19 PM, Dan Wing wrote: > >> > >>> But it doesn't matter what the ITSPs do inside their networks - > >>> we can do this without the ITSP needing to do per-transaction > >>> crypto, or TLS, or squat. If it causes them no harm, causes > >>> them no grief, and lets them continue Business As Usual, it's > >>> a win for them and a win for the edge (their subscribers). > >>> > >>> We can provide edge-to-edge identity (between enterprises, or > >>> handset-to-handset) in both worlds: the world that exists (which > >>> has ITSPs with B2BUAs and SBCs) and the world that we hope will > >>> exist (RFC3263 routing on the Internet, perhaps with some > >>> peer-to-peer sprinkled on top). SIP's current identity mechanism, > >>> RFC4474+RFC4916, only works with the latter. > >>> > >>> I want an identity mechanism that works with both. And I have > >>> long been convinced it is possible to build such a beast. > >>> > >> But *who* is going to deploy it? > >> > > > > The very same entity that cares about identity: the subscriber > > connected to the ITSP, such as an enterprise connected to its > > SIP trunking provider. > > > > Ah, so this argues for the media-path identity. I don't have > as strong an opinion on that yet. My (possibly naive) first > impression is that it has no better chance of surviving the SBC > sausage factory any more than 4474 does (given that SBCs tend to sit > on the media path, too).
Our views clearly differ on the survivability of 4474 identity through SBCs and the survivability of other identity techniques through SBCs. I don't see how to reconcile those views, as there are ample I-D's written by myself and others that attempt to explain how 4474 fails and there are three other techniques that exist as individual drafts. > But this doesn't give any rationale for signing P-Asserted-Identity > (which will need to be stripped off as it leaves the enterprise, > rendering your use case pretty much moot). -d _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
