Here is an example:
UAC alice issues an INVITE to UAS bob. bob likes alice, so he accepts the INVITE What bob doesn't like is having alice do weird stuff in a conferencebob doesn't know that alice is into weird stuff until he gets to this bizarre MIME disposition (note I use "disposition" here, because "handling" is clearly wrong for this purpose)
If bob rejects the INVITE because he doesn't like the MIME disposition, bob has no way to say why he rejects the INVITE. He can reject the MIME type, but that is draconian and does not let alice know her deficiency is wanting to do something weird. bob may very well accept the MIME type with a different MIME disposition. Likewise, he may be very happy to accept a normal INVITE.
On Sep 23, 2008, at 10:07 PM, Xiangsong Cui wrote:
Hello all,I want to make a supplement because I think the new-introduced participant in the use case is a SEND-ONLY participant (fetching ... to the participants), how about the solution in this situation?To Eric: the statement on the authentication in RFC4483 is as follow, is it enough?"For confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, this content indirection mechanism relies on the security mechanisms outlined in RFC 3261. In particular, the usage of S/MIME as defined in section23 of RFC 3261 provides the necessary mechanism to ensure integrity,protection, and confidentiality of the indirect content URI and associated parameters. Securing the transfer of the indirect content is the responsibilityof the underlying protocol used for this transfer. If HTTP is used,applications implementing this content indirection method SHOULDsupport the HTTPS URI scheme for secure transfer of content and MUST support the upgrading of connections to TLS, by using starttls. Notethat a failure to complete HTTPS or starttls (for example, due to certificate or encryption mismatch) after having accepted theindirect content in the SIP request is not the same as rejecting theSIP request, and it may require additional user-user communication for correction. Note that this document does not advocate the use of transitivetrust. That is, just because the UAS receives a URI from a UAC thatthe UAS trusts, the UAS SHOULD NOT implicitly trust the object referred to by the URI without establishing its own trust relationship with the URI provider.Access control to the content referenced by the URI is not defined by this specification. Access control mechanisms may be defined by theprotocol for the scheme of the indirect content URI." Thanks and Regards Xiangsong ----- Original Message ----- From: Paul Kyzivat To: Sedlacek Ivo Cc: 'SIP IETF' Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2008 11:42 PMSubject: Re: [Sip] [sip] extensions of "handling" parameter ofContent-Disposition headerSedlacek Ivo wrote: > Hello, > > see further explanation below.> There is a SIP based multiparty conference with a focus - every participant > is connected using a SIP dialog to a central focus, which mixes/ switches> Media sent by the participants.> One of the participants wants the focus to fetch e.g. a picture / an audio > clip from an HTTP server / an RTSP server and play it to the conference> participants using their media streams negotiated in SIP dialogs. > Hope this makes this use case clearer. > As mentioned above - by "sharing the resource" I meant the focus is> fetching the picture / audio clip from the HTTP server / the RTSP server and > distribute it using the MSRP / MSRP media streams agreed in the SIP sessions> to the participants. This sounds like a desire to have the conference mixer do something special. As such, something around mediactl might be appropriate. Or, it might be viewed as introducing another sort of participant into the conference. Perhaps this could be done by sending a REFER to the focus, with a URL for the resource in the Refer-To header. Thanks, Paul _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
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