STRATFOR'S MORNING INTELLIGENCE BRIEF SITUATION REPORTS - Oct. 28, 2003
1138 GMT - CHINA: China, which just successfully sent its first manned flight into space, now is planning to send three astronauts into space for a seven-day mission, Chinese space engineer Xu Dazche said Oct. 28. The mission -- aboard the Shenzhou IV -- is expected to take place within the next two years, if not sooner. China's goals for space are now to attempt a space walk and possibly set up its own space station, Xu said. Initially, senior Chinese space officials said the next mission would involve two people, not three. 1131 GMT - JAPAN: Campaigning for Japan's Nov. 9 elections has begun, and early polls indicate that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will receive 34 percent to 37 percent of the vote, while the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), will garner 12 percent to 19 percent of the ballots. Polls also show that about 40 percent of voters still are undecided. Meanwhile, DPJ officials reportedly will seek the creation of a coalition to remove Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from office after the elections. Koizumi said that he would not seek support from opposition parties should the current three-party coalition -- the LDP, the New Komeito Party and the Conservative Party -- fail to win the majority. 1127 GMT - ITALY: Italian journalists walked off their jobs Oct. 28 -- bringing newspaper production to a halt -- in protest of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's proposed pension reforms. The walkout by journalists follows a nationwide strike Oct. 24, in which about 1.5 million workers, or 10 percent of Italy's workforce, left their jobs and protested in the streets. 1122 GMT - COLOMBIA: Colombia's National Liberation Army will begin releasing the seven tourists the rebel group kidnapped Sept. 12, negotiator Hector Fabio Henao said Oct. 27. Henao added that the hostages -- four Israelis, a Briton, a Spaniard and a German -- would begin to be released the week of Nov. 3 to a commission set up by President Alvaro Uribe Velez. 1118 GMT - RUSSIA: Russian Deputy Industry and Science Minister Vladimir Fridlyanov has increased 2003 growth expectations for Russian industrial production from 6.4 percent to 6.5 percent. 1115 GMT - IRAQ: At least four Iraqis were killed and several others were injured Oct. 28 when a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside a police station in Al Fallujah, witnesses said. 1110 GMT - KASHMIR: Thirty-five people were injured when Kashmiri militants tossed grenades into a telephone exchange Oct. 28 in Srinagar, witnesses said. The Kashmir Freedom Force claimed responsibility for the attack, which was followed by a report that militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba would intensify attacks during the month of Ramadan. Meanwhile, the Hurriyat, the main umbrella group for Kashmiri separatist parties, said it needed more time to consider the offer by Indian officials to hold peace talks. 1105 GMT - SAUDI ARABIA: U.S. officials warned its citizens Oct. 28 to avoid all nonessential travel in Saudi Arabia after receiving what they called credible information about possible attacks against aviation and western targets in the oil-rich country. This is the second time the U.S. State Department has warned the 40,000 U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia to take precautions during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, but the first time it has cautioned against travel. Saudi officials call the warning "exaggerated precaution." ************************************************************************ Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003 The guerrillas continued the offensive that began the weekend of Oct. 25-26, marking the beginning of Ramadan. Five suicide attacks killed 35 people, most of them Iraqis. One of the targets was the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Iraq -- one of the few genuinely neutral nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in the world, and one that is almost never targeted in conflict. In addition, several police stations were attacked. The emerging goal of this offensive appears to be three-fold. First, to demonstrate that the guerrillas are not being contained by the United States. Second, to attack Iraqis collaborating with the U.S. occupational forces -- such as the police -- thereby discouraging further collaboration, particularly Iraqi participation in a resurrected Iraqi army. Finally, the guerrillas appear to be trying to force NGOs, such as the ICRC and the United Nations, out of Iraq by targeting their personnel. In other words, apparently the goal is to leave the United States isolated and on the defensive. It is difficult to know what to make of the offensive. There are three possibilities: 1. This is a permanent, planned intensification of the war. 2. This is a surge operation that cannot be sustained. 3. This is the guerrillas firing off their last rounds in a flourish as Ramadan begins. We strongly doubt that the third is true. The guerrillas have not been under particularly heavy pressure from the United States and it seems unlikely that they are about to burn out, let alone fade away. That leaves the first two choices, and on these hangs the U.S. occupation of the Sunni regions of Iraq. Thus far, the assumption has been that the Iraqi guerrillas are able to maintain a fairly low level of operations, and can maintain that level for an extended period. This theory does not preclude occasional surges in operational tempo. But it does preclude a substantial increase in the tempo that can be permanently maintained. For that to be the case, the guerrillas would have to maintain reserves of personnel and munitions, including standby suicide bombers. The alternative explanation would be that they are receiving reinforcements through recruitments in Iraq, foreign infiltrations or a combination of the two. That would be extremely bad news for the United States, if it were true on any substantial scale. It would mean that the guerrillas could make up for attrition -- meaning that their destruction over time wouldn't happen. It also would mean, depending on the rate of recruitment and infiltration, that the guerrillas had the ability to control the tempo of the war. In other words, it would mean that the guerrillas aren't going away any time soon. We would be surprised if the upsurge were due to domestic recruitment. Any attempt to recruit widely in Iraq would run the serious risk that U.S. intelligence would slip agents into the ranks of the guerrillas. Vetting guerrilla recruits during a war would be difficult. That leaves infiltration. It is easier to vet recruits outside of Iraq and then send small groups into the country -- this would increase the guerrillas' effectiveness while containing the threat of security failure. That brings us to two theories. The first is that this is a surge operation using available guerrilla forces with minimal outside support. The other is that fighters infiltrating the country are augmenting the guerrillas who originally started the guerrilla war. That leaves the minor question of from where did they originate. The obvious candidate is Syria, but they could be coming from anywhere at this point. They might be coming from everywhere. If this is not a surge operation that exhausts guerrilla capabilities temporarily, but turns out to be a fairly sustained increase in operational tempo, then the United States has a significant infiltration problem on its hands. It cannot even begin to think about defeating the guerrillas until it creates a system to monitor the frontiers and interdict infiltrators. Interdiction warfare is a complex and difficult business, but it is the business the United States is being forced into -- unless it chooses to attack foreign sanctuaries directly. As difficult as the problem is, it should be taken into perspective. Most of Iraq is not undergoing guerrilla warfare. Only a small portion is. The guerrillas are not able to do what the Afghan guerrillas can do: form larger units to seize and temporarily hold terrain. Even this increased operational tempo leaves it well short of that threshold. That said, as was learned in Vietnam and Algeria, one of the battlefields in a guerrilla war is the home front. The most serious effect of this war will be on the United States in an election year. That makes the military situation trickier because some of the most important victories in a guerrilla war are not easily discernible. That creates a temptation to launch decisive -- and usually futile -- attacks. Whether this is a surge or a true escalation, that is precisely what the guerrillas are hoping to provoke. ************************************************************************ For more Stratfor analysis and situation reports, please visit http://www.stratfor.biz/ ________________________________ Changes to your subscription (unsubs, nomail, digest) can be made by going to http://sandboxmail.net/mailman/listinfo/sndbox_sandboxmail.net
