The front-ends can do some quick and dirty scanning before they fire a
query. (Most don't do) still possible.

We need a mechanism to filter out queries with some criteria.

the /update vulnerability can to be addressed w/ an Apache front
ending the server w/ ip based Access control.

On Fri, Jul 11, 2008 at 10:38 PM, Erik Hatcher
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Jul 11, 2008, at 12:56 PM, Noble Paul നോബിള്‍ नोब्ळ् wrote:
>>
>> * /update has to be enabled because that is used by the commit script
>> to reload any new snapshots
>
> Even a servlet filter (or fronting web-server*) could turn off /update
> requests straightforwardely.  Filter to allow only internal servers would do
> the trick, no?
>
> * I'm not necessarily proposing jetty be actually talking directly to
> browsers, but no reason why solr.war need be hidden from them either,
> providing we iron out whatever /update issues there are.
>
> Surely there are other alternative ways a Solr instance can be commanded to
> pull a new index besides an HTTP request, but I do freely admit that
> deployment is not my forte.
>
>> * user firing queries like *:* can cause heavy load on the server (if
>> dismax is the not the only one)
>
> That's why I specifically constrained to a reasonable query parser.
>
> The runaway query problem is, though, a problem regardless of whether Solr
> is fronted by another web UI tier or not.  One could argue that is the
> problem of the front-end system to manage, but in reality users are passing
> queries straight through without massaging, through any number of layers of
> architecture.
>
> So /update is the only concern with Solr itself being a UI server?
>
>        Erik
>
>
>>
>> --Noble
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 11, 2008 at 10:15 PM, Erik Hatcher
>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Jul 11, 2008, at 11:08 AM, Noble Paul നോബിള്‍ नोब्ळ् wrote:
>>>>
>>>> It is not a recommended practice to expose Solr to the end-users
>>>> because it is so easy to bring down the server if the user knows that
>>>> it is a Solr server. We must devise a good mechanism to filter the
>>>> kind of commands that can be served .
>>>
>>> If all the request handlers were turned off but a /select constrained to
>>> dismax, what vulnerabilities exist?
>>>
>>>      Erik
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> --Noble Paul
>
>



-- 
--Noble Paul

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