Rethinking South Sudan’s foreign policy
Wednesday, 02 May 2012 07:30 Muna Tesfai Reports . Notwithstanding tweaks associated with the status of a "rebel" movement in the courtyards of international diplomacy, pundits reflecting on South Sudan's years of struggle with the North recall that the SPLM used to have a very robust representation in the centres of power around the world. "The strategy used by our late leader John Garang and others who represented our people abroad which was based on 'tapping' into the networks of NGOs, religious-based groups and South Sudanese in the Diaspora played a central role in filling the gap that was created by lack of official diplomatic relations," notes Peter Biar, director of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis in Juba. With Independence and consequent separation between the party and the state, the SPLM now maintains relations of sorts with political parties in the region and continent, Biar observes, but says the SPLM falls way short in the area of State diplomacy. He says there have been shortfalls in the transition from the diplomacy of a Movement to that of a Government. Conversely, Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, the former deputy head of the Southern Sudan Mission in the United States believes that the SPLM has to a large measure been on top of things. "We have been able to mobilize the little resources we had and approached the entire international community successfully," he contends, noting for instance, that South Sudan was able to secure international recognition without four days of its declaration of independence. Even so, Di-Aping readily admits that the SPLM administration is grappling with the "dilemma of modern state diplomacy". "We have not managed the transition from the day we declared Independence to the time of forming the Government," Di-Aping affirms, saying the foundations for a robust state diplomacy should have been laid early starting from January 2011. That way, by 9 July (Declaration of Independence) South Sudan's foreign policy and the deployment of diplomats would have been in place. Biar agrees, noting that "right from the independence of South Sudan, the Government did not have ambassadors anywhere in the world." According to Biar, the need to market the image of the new nation – with Khartoum exerting all efforts to convince the world that South Sudanese would not be able to rule themselves – was not addressed. To illustrate the ineptitude of its diplomacy, Di-Aping cites the way South Sudan announced the liberation of Heglig (Panthou), noting South Sudan diplomats did not speak anywhere and that the country's first submission to the United Nations on the matter was one week later. Along the same parallel, Biar notes the quick reaction from the international community, and the consensus that the seizure of Heglig (Panthou) was an extremely dangerous step by South Sudan. "One thing you cannot afford to do with the international community, especially when it comes to the use of violence, is the element of surprise. Especially among your allies. Nobody wants to be surprised," Biar points out. Like one false move begetting another, Di-Aping too reasoned that withdrawing from Heglig (Panthou), without insisting on UN forces coming in as a buffer between Sudan and South Sudan, undermines South Sudan's territorial security and integrity. Di-Aping is of the conviction that South Sudan needs to coordinate three responses: to safeguard the security and independence of the country, to talk to all international centres of power, and to adopt an effective media strategy. Arguing in the same direction, Biar notes that although the arbitration on Abyei excluded Heglig (Panthou) from the region, the National Congress Party of Sudan pursued the process with a marketing strategy that stressed an exchange of Abyei for Heglig (Panthou). He believes that was how the international community looked at it, taking into consideration the huge financial losses Sudan would suffer in the event of separation. To pull its diplomatic bearings together, Di-Aping recommends that the President of South Sudan should send special envoys to all centres of power. He also believes there is an urgent need for the President to appoint a special advisor on diplomatic affairs. Biar reckons there are lessons to be learnt from the Heglig (Panthou) crisis to rethink the country's diplomacy. "We have to examine where things have gone wrong, and we need to engage with our allies very seriously and directly and to inform them about the moves we make," he says. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob?hl=en.
